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Abstract

It has been shown that thousands of industrial control devices are exposed to the
Internet, however, the extent and nature of attacks on such devices remains unknown.
The first step to understanding security problems that face modern supervisory control and
data acquisition (SCADA) and industrial controls networks is to understand the various
attacks launched on Internet-connected field devices. This thesis describes the design and
implementation of an industrial control emulator on a Gumstix single-board computer as
a solution. This emulator acts as a decoy field device, or honeypot, intended to be probed
and attacked via an Internet connection. Evaluation techniques are developed to assess
the accuracy of the emulation implemented on the Gumstix and are compared against
the implementation on a standard PC and the emulation target, a Koyo DirectLogic 405
programmable logic controller (PLC).
The results show that the both the Gumstix and PC emulator platforms are over
97% accurate for Nmap OS Fingerprint Scans, over 99% for standard web and industrial
protocol queries, and 100% accurate for Metasploit exploit execution.

The logging

capabilities of both platforms are excellent, with 97.21% of all packets being logged by the
Gumstix and 99.99% of all packets being logged by the PC when the results of all scenarios
are combined. Though the timing-level accuracies for the PC platform are significantly
faster than the target PLC, the results of the Gumstix platform significantly slower as
defined by the 99% confidence intervals for the mean.
Based on these results, extensive knowledge of the specific implementations of the
protocols or timing profiles of the target PLC are required to identify and fingerprint
the Gumstix device as a honeypot. Furthermore, there are very few actively maintained
SCADA honeypot systems available, and the number of ICS honeypots accessible from
the Internet is also likely very few. As a result it is speculated that SCADA honeypots

iv

are not actively being looked for by attackers. Based on this, the results suggest that
a honeypot implemented on a Gumstix emulator is suitable for applications in SCADA
attack-landscape research. Further research should be conducted to increase the timing
performance of the emulator before being deployed in applications that are sensitve to
emulation timing discrepancies, such as SCADA laboratory research. In these types of
applications, the PC platform should be used.

v
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EMULATION OF INDUSTRIAL CONTROL FIELD DEVICE PROTOCOLS

I.

1.1

Introduction

Motivation
In 2011, it was shown that a substantial number of Industrial Control Systems (ICS)

devices were actively connected to the Internet despite claims to the contrary [Lev11]. The
research provides strong evidence that ICS devices are exposed to the Internet, however, it
is still largely unknown to what extent the identified industrial control devices and others
are being attacked. The life expectancy, cost, and remote physical location of distributed
control systems (DCS) and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) devices
make asset owners reluctant to replace them for the sole purpose of applying security
[HoL10]. With the high number of attack opportunities that Internet exposure provides,
and lack mandatory compliance with current security policies, there is little hope that these
devices are safe. However, data is still needed describing the frequency and severity of
attacks of Internet connected industrial controlled devices.
Furthermore, studying attacks of industrial systems requires researchers knowledgeable in industrial control systems and Information Technology (IT) infrastructure as well
as data from past industrial attacks. Costs of even a modest industrial control system for
purely educational use can quickly surpass $100K, making research, education, and training a significant investment.
A need exists for a scalable and cost effective solution that is suitable to address
research problems both in the laboratory and on the Internet. In addition, a need exists for
a platform for training and education of SCADA and ICS attacks before progress can be
made in understanding, and ultimately preventing attacks on industrial networks. Current
1

solutions exist that address one of these aspects, but none are adequate to address all needs
in a cost effective manner.
One solution is the emulation of field devices such as programmable logic controllers
(PLC) that can interact with other SCADA and DCS components including other field
devices and control software. Emulation is different from simulation because simulators
model the way a target system works, but do not actually need to behave the same, as in a
flight simulator [Rot00]. Therefore, an emulated field device is able to perform the same
actions as the target PLC, but is implemented completely in software. Emulated industrial
control systems therefore combine the best of both real hardware devices for research and
education, and software simulations for scalability and low cost through custom software
implemented on dedicated hardware.
1.2

Research Goals
The goal of this research is to develop a low-cost, portable, and configurable industrial

control emulator for a popular type of PLC for application-level services. The design of the
emulator is based on criteria that prioritize cost and performance in the implementation of
a SCADA attack-landscape research honeypot. The target PLC is a low-cost PLC with
Internet connectivity, the Koyo DirectLogic 405 with the ECOM-H4 Ethernet Module
[Aut12b]. Though it is less common in critical infrastructure, this device is widely used at
the plant and factory level in systems across many industry sectors [Dig12a].
This research aims to establish metrics to quantify the emulator’s performance on
two popular computing platforms, the Gumstix single board computer, and a standard
laptop PC. The metrics are chosen to assess the accuracy of the emulation and its viability
as a PLC honeypot for SCADA landscape research. These metrics are compared to
baseline measurements taken for the emulation target (the Koyo PLC) to determine the
quantitative accuracy of the emulation with regard to response packet bytes, Nmap OS
Fingerprinting, Metasploit attack success, and response timing. Logging capability of the
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emulator platforms is also measured to ensure suitability as honeypot and research tool to
log all interactions.
The experiments conducted seek to answer questions about the accuracy and logging
performance of the emulator on the Gumstix and PC platforms. The questions address
packet, scanning, attack, and timing levels of accuracy, as well as the extent that queries
and responses to and from the emulator are logged. The impact of request frequency and
emulator platform (Gumstix vs PC) is also assessed.
These accuracy and logging metrics are designed to determine the suitability of the
emulator as a honeypot and research tool. It is hypothesized that the industrial controls
emulator implemented on both the Gumstix and PC platforms is accurate to both standard
and non-standard queries, and is able to log all packets to a remote logging service. The
metrics are designed to compare the target PLC and emulated systems to quantify the
accuracy of the emulator. The results form the basis for a qualitative determination on
emulator authenticity, as describe in Chapter 3.
1.3

Thesis Layout
This chapter introduced the motivation and goals of the thesis research. Chapter

2 provides background information and fundamental concepts on SCADA systems and
emulators, as well as recent work related to SCADA and ICS field device emulation.
Chapter 3 details the design and implementation of the PLC emulator system. Chapter
4 outlines the methodology used to quantitatively asses the accuracy and functionality of
the implementation. Chapter 5 provides discussion and analysis of the experimental results.
Chapter 6 discusses conclusions from the results and provides details and suggestions for
future work.

3

II.

2.1

Literature Review

Introduction
This chapter provides background information needed for a basic understanding of

SCADA systems, emulators, and honeypots. Section 2.2 provides relevant information on
industrial control and SCADA, including relevant protocols, threats to their security and
previous attacks on SCADA networks. Section 2.3 discusses the concept of the device
emulation, examples of implementations, and applications. Research related to industrial
control emulators and honeypots is discussed in Section 2.5
2.2

SCADA
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are large, highly-

distributed networks that monitor and control industrial processes and are highly integrated
into critical national infrastructure systems. In fact, SCADA systems are the nervous
system of the industrial infrastructure animal. Many national infrastructures such as oil
fields, power grids, Uranium enrichment facilities, and utility delivery systems depend
on SCADA networks and, on a smaller scale, distributed control systems (DCS). These
systems provide real-time sensor data from the field to operators that may be miles or even
thousands of miles away and are capable of remotely adjusting control system parameters.
DCS and SCADA both fall under the broader classification of industrial control systems
(ICS), and the three terms are often interchanged depending on the specific industrial
application being discussed [SFK11]. Although the focus of the background research is
on SCADA systems, all of the concepts developed, are directly applicable to DCS.
The main purpose of SCADA systems is to extend the operator’s visibility and
interaction to processes that would normally be impossible due to distance or access
restraints [Boy09]. To increase the operator’s span of control, SCADA systems are made
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up of complex networks that include both hardware and software components. Figure 2.1
shows different sub-systems of a typical SCADA system, with the primary control center
at the top. Inside the control center, are the human operator, the console with integrated
human machine interface (HMI), and Master Terminal Unit (MTU), along with additional
support equipment.
If the operator is the heart of the system, the MTU is the brains. The MTU is
a computer whose primary role is to store and process data collected from distributed
field devices, which is no small task considering there may be thousands of field devices
scattered over thousands of square miles. In this context, anything local to the operator is
considered to be physically located in the control center, and anything located remotely is
considered to be in the field.
In addition to communicating with field devices, the MTU communicates with the
operator via some type of HMI or console. For very simple systems, the entire HMI may
simply be a switch board and lights. However, modern systems typically implement the
HMI on a computer running customized software. The operator has complete view and
control of the system through a graphical interface. He or she can poll data from different
field units, modify the status of actuators or valves based on usage requirements, and in
many cases, even re-program field devices. In addition to the primary control center, many
large SCADA networks may also implement regional control centers. The primary control
center delegates process supervision to regional control centers to more effectively control
the system. This delegation both increases the span of control of the primary control center
and reduces the distance that information must travel from remote field stations to the
regional control center before being processed. Because of the distance between a primary
and regional control center, the communication link may consist of a Wide Area Network
(WAN), telephone network, or even satellite. Though the operator does have the ability to
make changes to the SCADA system via the HMI, more than 99% of all messages from
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the MTU are automatic [Boy09]. This is particularly true for very complex or very large
systems where thousands of measurements and control signals are sent to and from the
MTU every second.

Figure 2.1: A Typical SCADA System(Adapted from [SFK11])

Remote development and maintenance is a significant consideration for SCADA
systems. Despite the fact that many field devices in SCADA networks are not easily
accessible or situated in harsh locations, their application software still needs to be
upgraded and maintained. For this type of system development and troubleshooting, a
special type of HMI called an engineering workstation is used and is typically located in
the control center. This workstation has the same functionality of an HMI but includes
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development tools that allow system designers to program remotely, collect diagnostic data
not typically displayed to the operator, and modify the HMI software used on the operator’s
console. Since these workstations have access to the SCADA network in the same way as
a standard operator’s HMI, they are sometimes used as an operator’s workstation when
not used for development [Cap10]. When the MTU (or operator) queries a remote unit,
the message travels from the control center to remote field locations and into specialized
control units and measurement devices that directly interact with physical processes. There
are many different types of field devices controlled by the MTU depending on the specific
industry and the processes being controlled. The two primary hardware field devices with
which the MTU communicates are remote telemetry units (RTU) (as opposed to remote
terminal units) and programmable logic controllers (PLC).
While similar in concept, there are differences between RTUs and PLCs. Legacy
RTUs, are limited to collecting sensor data and controlling actuators based solely on
commands from the MTU, with very limited computational power to independently control
processes. This type of RTU is only a slave device, responding to requests from the MTU,
and does not initiate queries of its own.
PLCs, on the other hand, have complex software programs that allow them to not only
transmit sensor data to the MTU, but also to control field processes independently. The
ability to build automated control loops using PLCs independently from the MTUs makes
them powerful. PLCs control complex processes locally based on user-programmed ladder
logic and set points, maintaining only routine interaction with the MTU. In addition to
reducing the amount of communication required between the MTU and PLCs, local control
also promotes fault tolerance, a main objective of SCADA systems [Jae08]. In a SCADA
system, PLCs are considered a slave device with respect to the MTU but are considered
masters of the processes they independently control. While some PLCs can act as master
devices to other PLCs, this functionality is more indicative of a small scale DCS rather
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than a true SCADA system. The attractive cost, availability, and versatility, make PLCs the
most universal field device. In addition to the PLC, MTUs also communicates with remote
terminal units, another popular type of field device.
Modern remote terminal units (RTU) are very complex, flexible, extensible, and
customizable with computational capacities far superior to even the most capable PLC.
A single modern RTU for a custom application can support many different protocols
simultaneously, provide long-term data logging, have expandable program memory
capacity, and endure a wide range of operating environments [Mot07]. There is a price
to be paid for such flexible and complicated systems, however. Lengthy setup time and
considerable cost put RTUs at a disadvantage, not to mention complicated requirements
scoping and lead times because they are often made-to-order systems.
Terminal RTUs frequently act as both the master and slave in SCADA networks. In a
standard SCADA system, intelligent electronic devices (IED) are slave devices to a master
RTU. IEDs include valves, breakers, sensors and protective relays which communicate on
any of a dozen different protocols. Where money and lead-time are no object, modern
RTUs may certainly be the answer, but this situation is practically non-existent in industry.
PLCs are a better alternative for most applications.
2.2.1

The Programmable Logic Controller.

PLCs date back to the late 1960s, where their primary motivation was to replace the
electromechanical relay-based control systems, which were prevalent in industrial systems
[Boy09]. By adopting PLC technology, system engineers traded in relay systems built using
hundreds of hard-wired devices with flexible, rapidly re-programmable, and physically
smaller microprocessor-based devices. The main advantages of PLCs over RTUs are their
relative low cost and modularity. PLCs are commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) devices, and
are readily available and replaceable while most modern RTUs are custom- built devices.
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PLCs are specialized embedded computers with many different manufacturers and
implementations. PLCs are a type of low-level field device in SCADA and industrial
networks that actually control the physical processes. For the purposes of this research,
all PLCs are considered to have common core characteristics: (1) ability to complete
electronic circuits and measure electronic signals, (2) are programmable in that, for some
arbitrary input, they are able to respond with some predefined response, and (3) in the case
of SCADA and industrial control systems, are networked with other devices.
2.2.2

ICS and SCADA Protocols.

Many different protocols exists for communicating between SCADA and ICS
equipment. Some protocols are open, meaning that the standards and specifications are
published, while others are proprietary, meaning the standards are unpublished. Open
protocols can be well understood simply by reading the specifications.

Proprietary

protocols, however, can have many intricacies that can only be understood after observing
many different types of protocol interactions. Even then, fully understanding a proprietary
protocol may be impossible. Depending on the application, the proprietary specifications
may be released to developers by the manufacturer under a non-disclosure or other written
agreement.
2.2.2.1

Modbus Protocol.

One of the most widely used ICS protocol is the Modbus protocol. In 1979 Modicon
corporation released Modbus as the first industrial communications network protocol which
was soon adopted as an industry standard [Plc12]. The ease of use without authentication
or excessive overhead makes Modbus one of the most widely deployed industrial control
communications protocols today. The protocol operates at the application layer of the open
systems interconnection (OSI) model, meaning it operates independently of the underlying
communication network.

In the case of the Internet, the underlying communication

network utilizes the transmission control protocol and Internet protocol (TCP/IP). The
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Modbus protocol is limited to one-way data initiation, meaning that queries only originate
from the MTU or other master device, to which the slave device responds [Kna11]. There
are several variants of Modbus including Modbus RTU and Modbus ASCII which are very
similar, and Modbus TCP. Any specific implementation of a SCADA network might use a
combination of these or other protocols.
Modbus RTU and Modbus ASCII Variants. Both the Modbus RTU and Modbus
ASCII communication variants are transmitted via serial communications protocols, and
are virtually identical.

The nature of serial protocols such as RS-232 and RS-485

limits the end-to-end lengths between communicating devices. The current Modbus RTU
Specification and Implementation Guide [Mod06] states that the maximum length for a
cable depends on "baud rate, the cable (Gauge, Capacitance or Characteristic Impedance),
the number of loads on the daisy chain, and the network configuration." Considering these
factors, practical implementations of Modbus RTU/ASCII on RS-485 are limited to a
maximum length of 1000m while RS-232 is limited to less than 20m [Mod06]. These
factors severely limit direct serial connections for SCADA networks.
The useful range of the Modbus RTU/ASCII protocol can be significantly increased
with modems to span the long distances using means such as radio, plain old telephone
system (POTS), cell phone service, or even satellite. Modems operate at the data link and
physical layers of the OSI model. Their job is to receive serial data from an MTU in
the Modbus RTU or ASCII protocol, encapsulate and transmit the data to another modem
across the selected medium. The second modem receives and decodes data back into a
serial message at the remote location and transmits it to the PLC. The PLC then sends
information back to the MTU the same way.
The need for dedicated modems to communicate across long distances makes the
Modbus RTU and Modbus ASCII protocols less attractive than their Modbus TCP
counterparts in many configurations. Additional considerations such as addressing limits,
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serial repeaters, and other electrical requirements make direct Modbus RTU and Modbus
ASCII less suitable for modern day, large-scale SCADA operations as compared to Modbus
TCP.
Modbus TCP Variant.

Of the three Modbus protocol variants, Modbus TCP has

become the most widely used. As the name implies, Modbus TCP is designed for use across
TCP/IP networks, commonly referred to as The Internet. In Modbus TCP, the Modbus
protocol fields are encapsulated in TCP packets in order to make remote communications
between the MTU and the PLC easier, since they can be routed over modern information
technology (IT) networks [Kna11].
Modbus TCP allows for an easier IT network topology to be designed and configured
compared to serial networks.

Furthermore, Modbus TCP is not constrained by the

addressing or distance limits because Internet protocols and specifications already address
those issues. There are very few reasons to build dedicated long-distance networks for
modern SCADA and ICS implementations using serial protocols, when the infrastructure
that comprises the Internet already exists. Many systems incorporate both serial and TCP
versions of Modbus. In these systems, Modbus RTU and Modbus ASCII are used for short
distance communication between devices at a remote field location, and Modbus TCP for
the long-haul between the MTU in the command center and remote PLCs. Thus, even
Modbus RTU and Modbus ASCII systems may encapsulate data in TCP/IP packets and
send them across the Internet exposing the SCADA or ICS network.
2.2.2.2

DirectNet Protocol.

The DirectNet protocol is an open-source protocol used by the DirectLogic family of
PLCs manufactured by Koyo Electronics Industries. This is a simple protocol used to read
and write memory locations on a PLC from another PLC, HMI, or engineering workstation.
Common uses of DirectNet are to upload or download system data such as Timer/Counter
status, I/O information, and variable memory information [Aut12a]. Like Modbus, the
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protocol is used across serial connections such as RS-232 and RS-422 or encapsulated in
IP packets for traversal across an IT infrastructure. Though DirectNet is not an industrystandard protocol, a popular variant known as the Communications Control Module (CCM)
protocol is virtually identical to the DirectNet specification. It is supported by most General
Electric PLCs and legacy Texas Instruments devices [Sof12, Gei10, Koy12].
2.2.2.3

K-Sequence Protocol.

The K-Sequence protocol is a proprietary protocol used exclusively by Koyo and
Automation Direct branded PLCs, including the DirectLogic family. This protocol can also
be transmitted across a serial connection or encapsulated in an IP packet. The primary use
of K-Sequence is to communicate between HMI software and PLCs including password
protection of memory segments, and transferring ladder logic to and from the device
[Aut11].
Because K-Sequence is a proprietary protocol, it is difficult to compare to the
DirectNet protocol and where one protocol is used over the other.

Many of the

capabilities between the two protocols appear equivalent based on published features. One
published difference between the capabilities of these protocols is that the K-Sequence
protocol can perform direct write operations on individual memory bits, giving it the
ability to control individual I/O points, while the DirectNet protocol is only writable at
the byte (8 bit) resolution [Tho05]. The K-Sequence protocol is implemented on all
Koyo/AutomationDirect PLCs, while DirectNet may not, making the K-Sequence protocol
more universal.
2.2.2.4

Host Automation Products (HAP) Protocol.

The HAP protocol is a proprietary protocol used for Ethernet communications
between an HMI or engineering workstation and ECOM Ethernet Module which is an
optional component for all Koyo/Automation Direct PLCs. HAP is also used for PLC
to PLC communications. This protocol is encapsulated in a user datagram protocol
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(UDP) packet, and is used to configure communications settings, upload firmware, and
to encapsulate other protocols, such as DirectNet and K-Sequence. Though this protocol
is proprietary, many free resources exist to help dissect it manually, including a software
development kit (SDK) provided by the manufacturer [Hos12, Wig12]. The manufacturer
can provide the SDK source code written in C to individuals directly for a legitimate use
[Hos12].
2.2.3

SCADA Communication Networks.

Depending on the application, any variety of communication protocols may be utilized
between an MTU and field PLCs. Many of them, like Modbus, K-Sequence, and DirectNet,
offer different variants optimized for use over a particular medium. Modbus offers a TCP
version intended to operate across a private IT network, but is often extended beyond the
private network across SCADA control networks to the Internet.
Whether intentional or not, there are consequences for utilizing the Internet for
SCADA communications. The most significant advantage for using the Internet for long
distance communication is cost. Everyone with an Internet connection shares the cost
to maintain the overall network, including the infrastructure. Furthermore, access to the
Internet is easy even in remote locations with complex networks of satellites, telecom
equipment, television cable, fiber optics, and radios connecting information systems
globally.
There are also negative consequences for connecting devices to the Internet. For
example, anyone can scan an Internet-connected device and potentially access it. Evildoers
are able to identify, probe, and exploit unprotected computers in as little as fifteen minutes
[Spi03a]. Attacks on Internet connected devices are commonplace, including attacks on
Internet connected ICS devices, and will continue to be a problem well into the future
[Con13].
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Connecting devices to the Internet puts the devices and the entire system at risk. Risk
is defined on a two-dimensional scale as a direct function of probability and consequence.
With the integration of equipment running Internet protocols like Modbus TCP and HAP,
SCADA system designers are accepting the risk of an attack as soon as they plug the PLC
into the network. The higher the consequences of an attack, and the higher the probability,
the more risk one accepts when connecting a device. Though the millions of people who
connect personal devices to the Internet every day accept a similar risk, the SCADA risk is
much greater because the consequences are much more severe.
Every SCADA device connected to the Internet is vulnerable to an attack, simply by
being connected. Vulnerabilities [PeP09, Saw11, San11] and automated exploits [Wig12,
Ras11, Rob12, Rap12] are released regularly. As more vulnerabilities are exposed, the list
of potential ICS targets on the Internet increases, and automated exploits put sophisticated
tools in the hands of all potential attackers, including low-skill script kiddies.

The

consequences of a successful SCADA attack using such automated tools are almost endless
e.g., lack of drinkable water, electrical grids shutting down, oil pipelines burst, power
generators destroyed, etc.
2.2.4

SCADA on the Internet.

In an attempt to discover just how many SCADA devices are connected to the Internet,
and to what extent they are vulnerable, graduate student Eireann Leverett of the University
of Cambridge developed a search tool in 2011 to match a list of vulnerable SCADA devices
to publicly-available exploits, and visualize the vulnerable systems on a map [Lev11]. The
methodology and results of the research are detailed in his Master’s thesis. Leverett used the
SHODAN search engine which allows users to find specific Internet connected devices like
routers, servers, PLCs, HMIs, etc, based on simple search terms [Sho10]. The difference
between SHODAN and a search engine like Google is that SHODAN allows users to search
for devices as opposed to websites by indexing response messages (banners) from Internet
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hardware. In combination with SHODAN, he used a well-known exploit engine to identify
which devices could be attacked with open-source exploits. Leverett’s SHODAN search
turned up many types of SCADA devices including HMIs, engineering workstations, and
various field devices by popular manufacturers including Allen Bradley, Powerlink and
SoftPLC.
At the 2011 SCADA Security Scientific Symposium (S4) conference, Leverett
announced that he discovered a total of 10,358 SCADA devices globally were directly
connected to the Internet over a two year span [Pet11]. The United States had by far the
most of any country with 3,920 Internet-connected devices [Lev11]. While not all of these
devices were remotely exploitable, many of them were. The exact number of exploitable
devices is unpublished. The fact that these SCADA devices were connected to the publicfacing Internet at all puts them at risk, since new vulnerabilities are released regularly.
Leverett’s research proves that SCADA devices are, in actuality, being connected to the
Internet, giving cause for concern. When presented with the results, many asset owners
associated with the Internet-exposed SCADA systems were unaware that their devices were
connected to the Internet at all.
To validate Leverett’s work two security consultants and researchers from InfraCritical.com began project SHINE (SHodan INtelligence Extraction) in April, 2012 [Dhs12a,
RaB12]. Also using the SHODAN search engine, an inital list of almost 500,000 of
Internet-exposed control devices was compiled. Working with the ICS computer emergencey response team (ICS-CERT), the researchers were able categorized each of the
500,000 suspect IP addresses by sector type, organization, and location, and determined
approximately 7,200 control system devices across the United States were exposed on the
Internet. This work undeniably confirms that SCADA and ICS devices are connected to the
Internet, and heightens the need for better understanding of the SCADA attack landscape.
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According to a 2009 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, SCADA
systems are often exposed via corporate IT networks [Gao09].

The integration of

automated utility billing and the development of the smart grid are driving commercial
business networks to interact directly and automatically with control networks.
Another reason SCADA and DCS devices are exposed to the Internet is by their default
configuration. Security features on newly installed products are often turned-off by default
for ease of installation [Doe02]. New models advertise their SCADA products as "drop-in
replacements" with advanced features and capabilities such as remote maintenance, email
service, and web service turned-on by default, whether needed or not [Doe02]. Unless
SCADA system integrators are cognizant enough to notice or diligent enough to check,
these features will remain on, leaving not just a single PLC but potentially the entire
SCADA network vulnerable [Doe02].
Default settings pose a common problem among many Internet-connected devices;
the manufacturers leave it to the users to protect themselves. Unlike most traditional IT,
SCADA systems tend to be more fragile, especially to network scanners. Two popular
network scanning utilities that are used to detect vulnerabilities on traditional IT networks
are Nmap [Lyo12] and Nessus [Nes12].
Nmap is a multipurpose port scanning tool that scans computers for potential
vulnerabilities such as open ports and services. It is also used to map complete network
topologies.

A view of open ports, services, and topologies on a system is vital to

understanding and securing the network. Similarly, Nessus scans network computers, but
is able to compare the vulnerabilities with publicly available exploits, giving the user a
practical assessment of device security. These types of scanning tools are vital to traditional
IT security administrators to control and assess their networks. The tools are also useful
for scanning SCADA networks with the same benefits. However, network scanners like
these have been shown to cause significant disruptions when used on SCADA networks.
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For example, a 2005 report from Sandia National Laboratory describes several occurrences
of real world losses due to network scans on SCADA networks [Dug05]. Actual examples
of negative behavior in response to network scans include the erratic movement of a 9 foot
robotic arm in an area shared with personnel, the malfunction of a microchip manufacturing
process resulting in $50,000 worth of lost electrical components, and a gas utility company
that had to shut-down gas delivery to its entire customer base due to unresponsive SCADA
equipment [Dug05]. SCADA system operators and maintainers are understandably hesitant
to scan their systems for vulnerabilities when the systems are directly connected to physical
processes. However, it is difficult to defend a network that cannot be adequately assessed
for security vulnerabilities and misconfigurations.
Besides scanning sensitivity, other differences make SCADA systems more difficult to
secure than traditional IT as well. The life expectancy of SCADA equipment is much longer
than typical IT equipment at around 7-20 years as opposed to only a few years for most IT
equipment [HoL10]. By nature of being highly distributed, many SCADA field devices are
in areas that are physically isolated or difficult to reach. These factors also weigh heavily
on SCADA managers, who concede it is far too expensive to replace equipment for the sole
purpose of applying security [HoL10].
Aside from these differences, SCADA systems are beginning to look more like
traditional IT networks in other ways. Modern SCADA networks implement SCADA
protocols that ride on Internet protocols, while legacy SCADA networks are being
retrofitted. Familiar user-level application interfaces, like web servers and email, are
emerging on individual devices exposing new vectors into old systems. Like the Internet,
the vast majority of our national critical infrastructure, much of which is controlled by
SCADA, is privately owned and operated, with estimates as high as 90 percent held
in the private sector [SFK11]. As SCADA networks start to look more like traditional
IT networks, the "air-gap" (i.e., physical isolation of industrial networks from insecure
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networks) between internal control and external corporate networks is being reduced. A
need to protect SCADA networks like traditional IT networks exists in order to prevent
them from being attacked.
2.2.5

SCADA Threats.

Because of both the similarities and differences from traditional IT, SCADA networks
are vulnerable to attack. While the consequences of a successful attack on a corporate IT
network can have devastating economic, personnel, and political consequences, traditional
IT attacks do not have the immediate physical impact that attacks on infrastructure have.
Stouffer et al. describes possible incidents can occur on ICS networks [SFK11]. In
particular, any SCADA or ICS element could be the target of an attack, from the HMI
all the way down to the field-level PLC devices, depending on what the desired outcome of
the attack is. Stouffer’s list of possible incidents includes:
• Blocked or delayed flow of information through ICS networks, which could disrupt
ICS operation
• Unauthorized changes to instructions, commands, or alarm thresholds, which could
damage, disable, or shut down equipment, create environmental impacts, and/or
endanger human life
• Inaccurate information sent to system operators, either to disguise unauthorized
changes, or to cause the operators to initiate inappropriate actions, which could have
various negative effects
• ICS software or configuration settings modified, or ICS software infected with
malware, which could have various negative effects
• Interference with the operation of safety systems, which could endanger human life
As a primary mitigation, Stouffer et al. emphasize the separation of industrial control
networks from corporate networks to reduce the exposure of the control network. Gone,
however, are the days where SCADA security can be based primarily on isolation; physical
access to the network is no longer necessary. As discussed in [HoL10], SCADA networks
are distributed by nature, and corporate networks often must be connected to control
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networks to function properly. There is no better proof of Internet-connected SCADA
systems than the recent empirical results from Leverett and Project SHINE, described in
Section 2.2.4. With over 7,200 Internet-connected devices discovered in the U.S. alone, no
one can dispute the Internet presence of SCADA.
Physical access is needed to infiltrate some systems. To emphasize this, Knapp
adds another possible incident to Stouffer’s list: malicious software (malware) infection
[Kna11].

The threat of malware on SCADA systems represents a different concern

that is unmitigated by system isolation as proposed in [SFK11]. The fact is, that even
truly air-gapped systems may still be susceptible via other means. By carefully crafting
malware to automatically propagate via removable media such as a USB drive, the
malware is able to arrive at its target: the air-gapped SCADA network. A malware
attack is particularly significant because, not only can malware initiate additional incidents,
but it can also force significant downtime due to forensic analysis, cleaning and even
replacement. Furthermore, malware attacks often go undetected by antivirus and other
protection mechanisms due to their constantly changing signatures. Examples ranging from
proof-of-concept SCADA malware [CNM08], to fully operational malware discovered in
the wild are readily available. The most famous example of the latter is Stuxnet, which
propagated onto an isolated network via a USB device, which is discussed further in Section
2.2.6. Both air-gapped and Internet-connected SCADA networks alike have vulnerabilities
that have been exploited by attackers in the past, and will continue to be targets in the
future.
2.2.6

Cyber Attacks: The Modern State of the SCADA Landscape.

One of the first publicly disclosed SCADA attacks was the 2000 attack on the sewage
control system in Queensland, Australia. A disgruntled former employee who worked for
the contractor that installed radio-controlled sewage equipment for the Maroochy Shire
Council used stolen equipment and knowledge of the SCADA systems to release 264,000
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gallons of raw sewage into local parks, rivers and the grounds of a Hyatt Regency hotel
[AbW08]. The 46 attacks occurring over two months resulted in significant loss of wildlife,
public health hazard, and an unbearable stench. This event demonstrated the consequences
of an intentional, targeted attack by a person with specialized knowledge of SCADA
systems, who in fact, was never even an employee of the organization he attacked [AbW08].
The SCADA network relied on wireless communication to transmit messages between
control units and field devices, which is a concept similar to being connected to the Internet
because potentially anyone with the appropriate equipment and knowledge can attack the
SCADA system.
Many examples of SCADA malware attacks exist. Perhaps one of the most widely
publicized has been the Stuxnet worm.

Stuxnet is an example of a highly-targeted

attack suspected to be directed towards nuclear enrichment control processes [Cla10,
BMS11]. Taking advantage of several unpublished vulnerabilities or zero-days in Microsoft
Windows, the self spreading mechanism of Stuxnet enabled it to move from an insecure
system to the air-gapped industrial network via a USB connection. Once in place on the
target network, Stuxnet gradually manipulated Siemens PLCs in a manner intended to ruin
the Uranium enrichment process. Stuxnet then modified information sent to the HMI to
make the operator believe the process was running correctly [FMC11]. The Stuxnet attack
demonstrates the consequences of an air-gapping-only protection strategy.
In November 2011 the deputy assistant director of the FBI’s Cyber Division
announced that hackers had accessed and been in control of SCADA systems in three
different cities, with one being a major US city [Hod11]. Though no actual attacks were
mentioned, it was said the attackers could "dump raw sewage into the lake" or "shut down
the power plant at the mall." This is a clear indication of the state of SCADA security.
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2.2.7

Researching SCADA Threats.

To research current threats and vulnerabilities, SCADA research facilities have been
developed within the public and private sector. Recognized as an issue of national concern,
the National SCADA Testbed was developed as a collaboration effort between the Idaho
National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratory in
2003 at a cost of $114 million. As the Nation’s premier SCADA research facility, it is
used to research the identification and mitigation of existing system vulnerabilities and
to develop advanced system architectures for more secure and robust SCADA systems
on a full-scale industrial level [Ken09]. This system provides a suitable testbed for realworld SCADA security threats, but is hardly a design an educational institution can follow
[Ine03].
On a smaller scale, the Mississippi State University has implemented their own
educational SCADA network, but it is limited to five control devices and two master
stations, which is practical for educational purposes, but inadequate for large industrialscale research [MVD10, Vau09].
In addition to testbeds that use actual SCADA equipment, pure software-based
simulations of SCADA networks as well as hybrid software-hardware configurations have
been implemented, such as the University of Illinois’ Cyber Security Testbed, or Royal
Melbourne Institute of Technology’s SCADA Security Testbed [DTO+ 06, QMJ+ 09]. These
test station configurations are used primarily for SCADA research, and are inferior to
commercial hardware configurations because the models are limited. However, their low
cost and scalability make them attractive particularly for researching SCADA network
protocols and interactions. These types of testbeds are typically built using network
simulation frameworks such as the Real-time Immersive Network Simulation Environment
for Network Security Exercises (RINSE) used in the University of Illinois’s configuration,
and Emulab [Emu12] and are useful for performing protocol simulations in complex
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network situations. These testbeds lack fine adjustments needed to adequately simulate
SCADA-specific aspects, such as firmware uploads or propagation of SCADA-specific
malware, making extension to applications that require a standard user interface awkward
at best.
Emulated industrial control systems combine the advantages of dedicated hardware
and cost effective, scalable software simulations. Emulators achieve this by implementing
industrial control system protocols and services on flexible programming platforms such as
Linux.
2.3

Emulators
An emulator is a "program that runs on one computer and thereby virtually recreates

a different computer" [Sla03]. An emulation is virtual because it is not actually physically
implemented, but functions like the original device. In many applications, the goal of
emulation is to reproduce the functionality of the target device with high enough fidelity
that emulation can replace it. The original device must be well understood at some level
because its intent is to accurately represent functionality of the original target device.
Emulation can be implemented at three different design levels, the application software
level, system software level, or hardware level [HoW05]. These three levels are a starting
point to define the difficulty in building an emulator.
Application level emulators reproduce the operation of individual programs, such as
a document reader or editor. These types of emulators are difficult to implement because
application software is often very complex and proprietary. Furthermore, it is difficult to
properly define the actual behavior of the system due to size and complexity of applications
and a total lack of specifications. Application level emulators can only reproduce the
functionality of the specific application for which they are designed. This type of emulator
is independent of the system software or hardware. It is also highly dependent on the
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operating system and hardware configuration in its environment to function, just like the
original application.
Emulating system software (i.e., operating system software) can be similarly
challenging because, it also consists of proprietary programming code. However, there are
usually much more complete specifications for system software compared to application
software. These specifications exist to make it easy for software programmers to write
applications based on the system software. Without them applications could not be written,
making the system software useless. Accurate and complete emulation of system software
enables execution of any arbitrary application. However, a system software emulation is
still dependent on the hardware device on which it was implemented.
Unlike these kinds of software emulations, hardware emulations are easier to define
and specify because the target hardware system must have been properly specified to be
built in the first place [Rot00]. Software is meant to be interpreted automatically by
hardware, and therefore the software is the specification. Hardware on the other hand
is meant to be interpreted by humans (or software) to actually produce a physical device
used as a building block for other hardware and software [Rot99]. Therefore, very detailed
specifications are usually available again because programmers need to know how to access
the hardware to write system and application software. After the hardware is accurately
emulated, arbitrary system and application software can be used as-is to perform their
respective operations.
In many modern implementations, especially embedded computing devices, all three
emulation levels might be proprietary and its software, closed-source. In this case, the only
"specification" available might be the actual operations and observable characteristics of
the application software, restricting emulation only to application level implementations.
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2.3.1

Emulated Honeypot Services.

There are many applications of emulators including the preservation of digital media
[Sla03], the implementation of obsolete game platforms [Sal05] and to promote business
efficiency as in the use of virtual machines like VMWare [Vmw13]. However, emulation
is used in the cyber security context in development of computer decoys or honeypots used
by security professionals to deter, delay, and gather information on network attacks.
Many honeypots emulate services and protocols designed to look and feel like the real
thing, but are non-working. Emulation produces better results than re-purposing production
machines because emulators can be customized to provide any set of services. Furthermore,
robustness and security can be prioritized as design features in emulators, which may not
be the case for a production device. These emulated honeypots usually provide only basic
responses to a very limited set of commands invoked by attackers. Honeyd is an example
of this type of emulated honeypot system. Created by Niels Provos, Honeyd is open-source
honeypot software that allows networks of arbitrary devices and services to be implemented
on an a single device [PrH07]. In addition to providing services for attackers to probe and
compromise, logging is a critical function for all honeypots. Specifically, the logging of all
network packets is critical to have a complete record of an attack. This record is used to
dissect attack methodologies, capture custom tools, and gather information on the attackers
themselves. The use of emulated honeypots is extended from traditional IT into industrial
control systems in Section 2.3.3.1.
2.3.2

Industrial Control Emulators.

Implementation of industrial control emulators at the hardware level is most desirable.
This allows emulation of the ICS hardware in software to run the industrial control device’s
firmware on any platform desired. Besides the legal and financial implications of reversing
proprietary embedded platforms, there are significant technical challenges as well. Even on
the same device, the use of many different architectures, platforms, and languages is likely,
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making the task very challenging. Additionally, the components inside these devices are
often unmarked, or are marked with custom serial numbers, revealing little about their
primary function.
To further complicate the task, firmware can be packed or cryptographically encoded
to only be decoded by the specific hardware [CKS+ 06]. From start to finish, the process
of emulating the true hardware configuration of an industrial control device is possible,
but it would be very expensive and time consuming. Furthermore, errors or failures in
the target device’s operating firmware would be in the emulator, by extension. From an
accuracy standpoint this may be desirable, but not from a robustness standpoint. Thus,
the best approach is to design and implement an application-software-level emulator on
dedicated hardware that reproduces observable and measurable network services available
on the target industrial control device.
2.3.3

Uses of ICS field device emulators.

With the development of an ICS field device emulator, extension of traditional IT
technologies and methods into industrial settings is possible. The focus of this thesis is
on applications for research of unknown SCADA attack factors for field devices exposed
to the Internet, which is discussed in this subsection. Additional applications include
laboratory research, evidence collection, cyber sensing, and SCADA education, and are
each developed in Appendix A.1.
2.3.3.1

SCADA Landscape Research Using Emulated Honeypots .

Traditional IT honeypots are often used to learn more about the specifics of attacks
on computer network systems. Lance Spitzner, a honeypot pioneer and founder of The
Honeynet Project, defines a honeypot as "a security resource whose value lies in being
probed, attacked, or compromised [Spi03a]." Industrial control emulators can be used
in the same way to implement SCADA honeypots to learn more about SCADA attacks.
Honeypots excel at surveying the landscape of a specific industry, commercial enterprise,
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or single company for threat trends, attack tools, and techniques specifically targeting that
area. Honeypots are especially effective in new research areas or industrial environments
where there is little to no data available. Questions about the current environment can be
answered such as: who is attacking, does exploit code exist for a particular vulnerability,
or has injectable malware been developed.
This lack of data on attacks and trends describes the current state of the SCADA
attack-landscape. It is suspected that many SCADA incidents go unreported. When they are
reported, usually very little data is made available to effectively monitor trends, however,
attack data is needed. SCADA vulnerabilities and exploits that target currently-deployed
devices are available, as discussed in Section 2.2.6. However, it is unknown if industry
wide attacks are actively occurring, and if so, what trends exist. Industrial control emulators
designed as honeypots could provide answers to these questions.
Just as research honeypots provide data on new vulnerabilities and exploits for
traditional IT systems, so too can SCADA honeypots achieve the same for industrial
networks. SCADA honeypots can also collect information on the attackers and their tools,
of special importance in SCADA applications where very little current data exists. In
the past, security research was limited to the tools that hackers left behind, but SCADA
honeypots can allow researchers to observe an entire attack from beginning to end because
of the common characteristic of all honeypots to maintain extensive logs of interactions.
Honeypots can be used to capture and identify automated attacks, as well as human-based
attacks. They can also serve as an early warning indicator or to record new methods or
approaches that have not been seen before, to understand the reasons behind an attack,
or even to better understand elite hackers [Spi03b]. Though some of these applications
might be beyond capabilities of emulated protocols and services, the concept of a SCADA
honeypot to perform exploratory attack research is sound.
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In these types of Internet landscape research applications, the main business of the
network revolves around the honeypot and its logging capability. As such, it must be
specially maintained to attract attention from hackers. Furthermore, it must look as
authentic as possible, fail like the target devices, and allow the collection of useful research
results in a conspicuous fashion. It is especially important to disguise the true function of a
honeypot. For example, if attackers can fingerprint the system as a honeypot, they can feed
it bad information over long periods in an effort to corrupt trend data.
Honeypots are of significant value on corporate networks as cyber sensors as well.
They alert security professionals that someone has gained unauthorized access to a system
or network when any interaction with the honeypot occurs. Alerts can simply be log
entries sent by the honeypot to a remote logging server, indicating interaction with the
honeypot. Because honeypots have no production value, there is no reason any legitimate
traffic should be flowing to or emanating from the honeypot. All traffic flow is suspect,
and as a result only interesting packets and details pertinent to an attack are logged. This
implies that many fewer log entries must be analyzed compared to other IT protection
mechanisms. As opposed to having to sort through gigabytes of logs and reports generated
by IDSs, firewalls, and servers, megabytes may be generated daily. Less data means it
can be analyzed in a more timely fashion, since almost all data generated by a honeypot is
valuable.
As an emulator, a honeypot can be designed to operate on any platform. Because of its
computing power, a standard PC is a strong candidate to implement a honeypot emulator.
The capability of the PC and the efficiency of the emulator implementation may even make
it possible for an entire network of many emulated honeypots (also called a honeynet)
to be implemented on a single device, similar to Honeyd. Another approach is to use
embedded systems with lower computing capacities to implement an emulated honeypot.
A device that is small, inexpensive, and capable of running a complete emulator would
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have many applications beyond use as a research tool, such as an educational tool, flyaway emergency response tool, and dedicated SCADA sensor. This research explores both
approaches—emulation via a standard PC approach, and via an embedded platform, the
Gumstix single-board computer.
2.4

The Gumstix Platform
Gumstix is the brand name of a small single board computer that is capable of running

various standard operating systems including Linux distributions. An example of its small
form factor is seen in Figure 2.2. First developed in 2002, the Gumstix platform has become
a popular embedded platform because it is inexpensive, small, and very powerful. They are
available in two different processor architectures, ARM Cortex-A8 architecture on a Texas
Instruments OMAP3503 applications processor, and the XScale architecture on a Marvell
processor [Gum12a, Gum12b]. The Cortex-A8 is a 600MHz 32-bit processor based on the
Advanced RISC Machine (ARM) architecture, where RISC stands for reduced instruction
set computer. The OMAP3505 gives the Gumstix device the ability to run general purpose
32-bit operating systems such as Linux or Windows, which makes it different than other
popular, less expensive embedded platforms such as the Arduino (based on the Atmel AVR
architecture) or popular PIC architecture based devices, which are programmed for specific
functions.
When coupled with an open-source, general purpose operating system like Linux, the
Gumstix becomes a superior development platform because application software as well as
kernel software can be reused, tailored, and optimized for a specific purpose in a familiar
environment. The advantages of using the Gumstix over another embedded platform are
specifically, the ability to run a full-featured operating system. This avoids many challenges
with process scheduling, network control, and memory management.
Much of the software used on Gumstix computers was originally developed for the
x86 platform. Since most of the differences between x86 and ARM are abstracted away, the
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development on the Gumstix platform becomes Linux development rather than embedded
development. Different Gumstix models are available and boast features like embedded
wireless local area network (WLAN) (IEEE 802.11b/g standard), added Digital Signal
Processors (DSPs), and extended operating ranges [Gum12a].

Figure 2.2: Gumstix Module to Scale [Gum112]

The Overo Earth COM, an ARM Cortex-A8 model, used in this research provides a
600MHz processor, with 512MB of RAM and 512MB of non-volatile on-board memory
in addition to a microSD card slot for additional memory. These modules ship with the
Angstrom Linux distribution 2.6.34 installed [Gum12a]. Another requirement for this
research is the use of an Ethernet expansion board to provide use of two Ethernet interfaces;
allowing collection of data over one Internet-facing connection and out-of-band logging
capabilities over the other LAN-facing connection. Despite the fact that the hardware
configuration of the Gumstix modules themselves is proprietary, the expansion modules
are open-source, making troubleshooting and development easier. The Tobi-Duo expansion
board provides two high-performance Ethernet controllers enabling simultaneous Ethernet
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connections. This duo-connection configuration lends itself well to the implementation of
an emulator for this research.
2.5

Related Research
Despite the fact that ICS field device emulators have the potential to fill a void in ICS

network security, the concept remains relatively unimplemented. While many commercial
solutions exist for traditional IT honeypots, there are no known commercial solutions that
implement ICS honeypots in a complete form.
Berman’s [Ber12] research entitled, "Emulating Industrial Controls System devices
Using Gumstix Technology," motivated the further investigation and development of
SCADA field device emulators on embedded devices for this Master’s thesis. Berman’s
work demonstrated that it is possible to emulate basic functionality of the Modbus TCP
protocol and out-of-band network logging on a low-interaction honeypot implemented on
a Gumstix single board computer.
Among the open-source community, there is currently one known actively-maintained
SCADA honeypot device developed by Digital Bond [Dig12b]. This project emulates key
high-interaction and low-interaction components of Modbus TCP, FTP, Telnet, HTTP, and
SNMP services for use on a Virtual Machine (VM). Because of the bulky VM, and steep
system requirements, such a device cannot run on a Gumstix.
Another interesting open-source implementation available from Digital Bond is a
honeywall. In this setup, an actual PLC is used to provide authentic interaction with the
attacker while the honeywall, also implemented on a VM, sits between the attacker and
PLC and is used to track and manage the attacker with various monitoring and capture
tools. This configuration has value mostly as a research tool because the significant setup
and overhead, in addition to the dedication of an actual PLC, makes implementation in an
actual industrial environment impractical.
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The first open-source SCADA honeynet project was developed by the Cisco Critical
Infrastructures Assurance Group (CIAG) lead by Pothamsetty et al. [PoF05], but became
defunct in 2005. The honeypot was based on Honeyd, the popular low-interaction honeypot
developed by Niels Provos. Source code and limited documentation are still available at
[PoF05], but the tool is no longer supported.
At least one implementation of the CIAG honeypot has been documented and
the results published. According to a report for the European based Critical Utility
Infrastructural Resilience (CRUTIAL) project, a low interaction honeypot based on the
work by Pothamsetty et al. was deployed for a nine month period in 2008 [FAA+ 09]. Ports
associated with published SCADA vulnerabilities were exposed to the Internet, as well as
network ports commonly used for SCADA protocols including port 502 for Modbus TCP,
and port 20000 for DNP3. TCP port 80 for HTTP and TCP port 21 for FTP were also
exposed. Over the observation period, very little interaction took place across the exposed
SCADA ports, with the majority of traffic occurring across the FTP port.
2.6

Summary
SCADA and ICS are exposed via the Internet. ICS vulnerabilities and exploits

are discovered regularly and despite their criticality, expense and convenience often
overshadow security priorities. Because of the cost and complexity of ICS equipment,
there is insufficient exploratory Internet and laboratory research being conducted to better
understand and combat risks to ICS and SCADA networks.
Emulation is a way to virtually replicate functions of complex systems, including
proprietary protocols and security measures. The development of an accurate ICS field
device emulator for use as a honeypot is a viable solution to researching ICS attacks,
particularly at the field device level where the actual control of processes occurs.
Despite the importance of ICS networks and their security, the extension of emulated
ICS honeypots as both a research and security tool for ICS networks has been slow
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to progress because of the proprietary and complicated nature of the devices, making
emulation difficult. This thesis simplifies the implementation of an ICS field device
emulator designed as a honeypot by duplicating the operation of key functionality on a
single-board solution which requires minimal setup and minimal operational impact.
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III.

Device Description

This chapter describes the design criteria and implementation of the PLC field
device emulator destined for this thesis research. Section 3.1 outlines important design
considerations for building an industrial control emulator for the purposes of SCADA
attack environment research. Section 3.2 describes in detail the design of the emulator
implemented for this research effort. Finally, Section 3.3 describes the how this specific
implementation is consistent with the criteria established in Section 3.1.
3.1

Design Considerations
Despite the fact that industrial control systems are fragile, quickly antiquated, and

often designed without security consideration, they are expensive, complex, and are
networked with other devices providing a vector into otherwise secure IT networks.
Through this network interface, most modern PLCs provide application-level services such
as web configuration interfaces, file transfer services, remote programming services, and
remote monitoring services, all which need to be replicated to create a valid emulation for
any particular application.
Industrial control emulators have several design requirements in common with
standard network emulators, but specific design requirements are defined by the industrial
control honeypot application itself.

In addition to the considerations of accuracy,

scalability, cost, and configurability for a network emulator such as those described in
[ZhN03], industrial control emulators must also consider authenticity, robustness, and
record keeping.
3.1.1

Accurate and Authentic.

Like network emulators, ICS emulations must be accurate to be authentic. Though
related, these ideas are distinctly different. Accuracy is quantitative and can be observed,
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measured, and emulated. Authenticity, however, is qualitative. Authenticity is the belief
that the emulation is what it claims to be [Lee05]. It is a measure of how realistic the
emulation is, compared to the target device. If the user looks at some emulated aspect
and finds what is expected, authenticity is established through accurate emulation. In other
words, based on the accuracy of the emulation, the user (human or machine) makes a
determination on the device’s authenticity and decides to proceed or not.
An emulation of a web-based interface, present on most modern PLCs, is accurate if
the page has the same banner, form elements, graphics, etc. based on how the page looks
in the web browser. If the web browser is the extent of the user’s interaction, then posing as
an authentic device is easier. However, if the user inspects individual packets, a device may
reveal itself as inaccurate if the packets do not match the target device, and therefore may
be discovered as inauthentic. To identify the target areas that require emulation, the concept
of levels of accuracy is developed which describes observable characteristics a user may
interrogate to establish device authenticity. To give the feeling of authenticity, an emulation
must be accurate on as many levels as practical. The following are examples of levels of
accuracy:
1. Superficial accuracy is established when a user believes the devices is authentic
based on what is visually observed, such as how the website or HMI looks.
2. Packet-level accuracy is established when a user believes the device is authentic
based on at the packets sent to and received from the device.
3. Timing-level accuracy is established when a user believes the device is authentic
based on the timing of queries and responses to and from the device.
4. Scanning tool accuracy is established when a user believes the device is authentic
based on the results of a scanning tool.
5. Attack tool accuracy is established when a user believes the device is authentic based
on the success of an exploitation tool.
The more skeptical a user is about authenticity of the device, the deeper the
interrogation. Therefore, the overall goal is to anticipate how deep a user will look for
signs of authenticity, and make those portions of the emulator accurate.
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The implementation of a perfectly accurate emulation is more difficult than simply
presenting the same web page as the target device. For some applications, such as
education and training applications, an emulation that is less accurate is acceptable because
authenticity need not be established; the device can be presented as an acknowledged
emulation with no ill effects to the training. However, as a landscape research honeypot, it
is hard to predict which features users will interrogate to establish authenticity. As research
is conducted, the emulation can evolve and become more accurate, and eventually look
authentic to everything that interacts with it.
A highly accurate device should operate exactly as the target device, but it should
also fail like the target device. Just because an emulator appears to fail the same way as
the target device, does not mean the emulator actually has to fail. It still can log inputs
despite no response from the emulator. Or in a honeypot or cyber sensing application a
better solution is to have the emulator re-manifest itself on a different network location to
allow for another attacker to find it and exploit it again, thinking that it is a different device.
This approach makes it look as though the original device went offline, corresponding
with device failure, but does not actually take down the honeypot, wasting potential data
collection opportunities.
3.1.2

Robust Operation.

It is important that any software-based device, especially those destined for research
environments be robust. A robust emulation is able to operate when any common computer
error occurs, such as when out-of-bounds or malicious input is entered or the device runs
out of memory, even when the target device would have failed (under conditions such as
buffer overflow, DoS attack, bad firmware uploaded, etc.).
Industrial control devices are notoriously sensitive due to lack of input sanitization
and testing as well as non-robust implementation of communications protocols. Even
seemingly benign network mapping tools can cause serious problems on industrial control
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devices as discussed in detail in Section 2.2.4. This makes industrial control emulators
more attractive than using a real device for training and research applications. As briefly
mentioned in Section 3.1.1, if the target device fails, an accurate emulator would appear to
fail similarly, but would continue to operate, or at least fail gracefully.
A significant advantage over real industrial controls is that the emulator cannot be
made unusable, commonly refereed to as being bricked. Even if the emulator locksup, there is no flash bootloader to accidentally overwrite, or electronically erasable
programmable read-only memory (EEPROM) to accidentally erase because the emulator
is implemented purely in software, ideally on a dedicated piece of hardware.
3.1.3

Cost Effective.

An industrial control emulator must also be cost effective. In fact, it is likely that most
use cases for an industrial control emulator (including honeypot applications) consider cost
a main driver for emulated versus using real hardware. Considering that single PLCs can
easily exceed $10,000, even using a high-end desktop PC as the emulation platform would
seem inexpensive, but good emulators can be implemented for much less than that.
Aside from monetary cost, the power budget may also be a driving factor in developing
an industrial control emulator. Hundreds of PLC systems emulating a network of many
honeypots (honeynet) may not be possible simply due to power requirements.
3.1.4

Rapidly Configurable.

Configurability is also an important factor in the design of a an industrial control
emulator, but the extent is application dependent. For honeypot applications, there is value
in rigid, hard-coded designs that emulate only a single type of device. These designs
allow for configuration of only device-specific parameters, such as networking features,
integrated protocol attributes, or firmware versions, by simply tweaking a configuration
file that defines the emulator’s operation. A single model or brand of PLC popular in a
specific industry can be chosen as the emulation target to conduct research specific to that
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industry. Despite the significant amount of effort required to implement a honeypot specific
to a single industry, once the design work is complete, the honeypot can be in service for
years, since a single PLC model might be used in industry for decades.
Nevertheless, a highly configurable device which enables the emulator to look like a
Siemens, Allen-Bradley, or Koyo PLC is even more valuable as an ICS honeypot because
a single device can be used to conduct research across any industry. Furthermore, an
emulator that can quickly and easily be configured to act like any arbitrary device has
significant potential in all ICS field device emulator applications. However, the amount of
research and development required for this type of rapidly-, highly-configurable device is
multiplied by the number of devices it can emulate, which may make it impractical from a
design standpoint.
3.1.5

Scalability.

An emulator is scalable if it can be easily ported to new platforms, and interoperate
effectively when large numbers of emulators (and possibly real devices) are chained
together in a honeynet. Scalability is an important consideration for any network-enabled
device and must be considered during the requirements stage. Because network-oriented
services that typically run on an industrial control system are designed to run on an
embedded computing platform on the ICS device(e.g., web configuration servers, industrial
control protocols like Modbus or HAP, FTP servers and email clients), the emulation of
such services does not require a significant amount of memory or computational power.
However, if the intent is to emulate many control devices on a single PC or limitedresourced Gumstix computer, scalability might become a significant challenge while trying
to emulate device timing accurately and consistently.
3.1.6

Record Activity.

Record keeping is the heart of an industrial control honeypot. Though most industrial
control systems do not provide this feature at a field-device level, it is invaluable to conduct
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attack research because complete and accurate records are required to fully dissect an
attack. Though logging can take place either locally on the device, remote logging via some
type of distributed service such as Syslog is superior because it can be used to instantly
alert researchers that a device is being accessed, a feature also critical for cyber sensing
applications.
The effectiveness of a logging mechanism is measured by the accuracy of the log
entries, and its ability to keep up with the activity that is occurring on the honeypot.
Considering that a typical device fingerprinting tool generates over 200,000 packets when
performing a port and services scan on a device, the logging mechanism must ensure that
it works efficiently but correctly in the sense that no entries are missed [Lyo09].
3.2

Implementation of the PLC Emulator
This section describes the emulator designed and implemented for this research thesis.

The tool is a PLC emulator designed primarily as a SCADA landscape research, and as a
result, seeks to optimize cost, accuracy, scalability, efficient logging, and to a limited extent,
configurability.
3.2.1

Custom Design Overview.

The PLC emulator is implemented on the 600MHz Gumstix Overo Earth single board
computer running embedded Angstrom Linux distribution 3.0.0 with a Tobi Duo network
expansion board to provide two 10/100 Ethernet connections. The Linux kernel is built
with iptables and Netfilter NFQUEUE modules to provide necessary Linux firewalling and
user-space network packet functionality. Iptables (pronounced "I-P-tables") is the standard
Linux firewall that is available for all Linux distributions. The NFQUEUE kernel module
allows packets to be pulled out of the Linux kernel and queued into user-space processes.
The target PLC is comprised of the Koyo DirectLogic 405 CPU, D4-08ND3S
Digital Input module, D4-08TR Digital Relay module and the H4-ECOM-100 Ethernet
Communications Module to provide the PLC with network connectivity. This hardware
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configuration is chosen because of its low cost, networking functionality, and the work done
by DigitalBond’s Project Basecamp that demonstrated significant security vulnerabilities
including an automated method to crack the device password [PeP09, Wig12].
To provide acceptable performance as well as reduced development time, the emulator
has portions written in both C and interpreted Python modules. The emulator consists of
seven simultaneously running user-space processes plus the Linux iptables firewall module
to provide three network services to users. The three emulated services are (1) a web
service on TCP port 80 that provides a configuration interface, (2) a Modbus TCP service
on TCP port 502, and (3) a Host Automation Products protocol (HAP) service on UDP port
28784, consistent with the target PLC.
3.2.2

Process Layout and Implementation.

In addition to the seven custom-designed user-space processes, five Linux commandline scripts are used to configure, start, and stop these processes correctly. In addition to
the user-space processes, the Linux iptables user-space program is critical to the operation
of the emulator [Ayu10]. The iptables application, which is available as a Linux kernel
module, allows implementation of a kernel firewall whose operation and properties are
defined through a user-space interface [Eyc12]. In addition to iptables’ ability to accept or
drop arbitrary packets based on their source, destination, or content, iptables can pull both
incoming and outgoing packets out of the kernel TCP/IP stack into user-space processes
for deeper packet inspection or packet mangling through what is known as an NFQUEUE
target. This allows for precise packet characteristic matching to identify arbitrary packets
to allow, drop, or modify them in any way, even before or after the packet has been to the
kernel TCP/IP stack for routing.
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3.2.3

Emulator Configuration and Process Control Scripts.

There are a total of two configuration scripts that establish the correct operating
environment for the implemented emulator, and three process control scripts that start and
stop the emulator processes. This section defines these scripts.
3.2.3.1

iptables_rules.sh.

This configuration script establishes the necessary iptables rules that filter and queue
the packets, which enter and leave the emulator. Iptables configuration rules build on each
other, and therefore the order of rules is important. Table 3.1 shows the iptables rules
described in the order they appear in iptables_rules.sh.
In Table 3.1, the queue number (i.e., "queue number 3") refers to a designated
userspace program to which iptables sends packets. These userspace programs are shown
in Figure 3.1 and discussed later in this Section. This feature is enabled by including the
NFQUEUE module into the kernel at compile time. Marking packets is another feature
of iptables. Packets that meet rule criteria can be marked with an arbitrary number that
remains with the packet as it traverses across the remaining iptables rules. Marks help
ensure certain rules do not get run more than once. The actual rules in iptables syntax are
available in Appendix C.
3.2.3.2

configure_emulator.sh.

This configuration script sets global OS network settings that establish the operation
of the Linux kernel network stack.

The values applied to these parameters in the

configure_emulator.sh script are temporary. That is, they return to their original default
value after operating system is reset. Parameters configured and their values are shown in
Table 3.2.
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Table 3.1: Iptables rules in the order they appear in iptables_rules.sh and their description.

Rule 1:

"For all incoming packets on eth0 that have not been marked with 0x02 send
them to queue number 3"

Rule 2:

"For all incoming TCP packets on eth1, with TCP destination port 22 (SSH),
accept"

Rule 3:

"For all incoming TCP packets on eth0 with destination port 80, send them
to queue number 1"

Rule 4:

"For all incoming TCP packets on eth0 with destination port 1, send them
to queue number 1"

Rule 5:

"For all incoming TCP packets on eth0 with source port 502 (Modbus),
accept"

Rule 6:

"For all incoming TCP packets on eth0 with destination port 502 (Modbus),
accept"

Rule 7:

"For all incoming TCP packets on eth0 that do not match a previous rule,
reject with TCP reset"

Rule 8:

"For all incoming UDP packets on eth0 with destination port 28784 (HAP),
accept"

Rule 9:

"For all incoming ICMP packets on eth0, send them to queue number 1"

Rule 10:

"For all incoming UDP packets on eth0 with destination port 1, send them
to queue number 1"

Rule 11:

"For all incoming UDP packets that do not match a previous rule, reject with
ICMP port unreachable"

Rule 12:

"For all outgoing TCP packets on eth0 with destination port 80, that have
not been marked with 0x1, send them to queue number 2"

Rule 13:

"For all outgoing TCP packets on eth0 with destination port 80, that have
been marked with 0x1, accept"

Rule 14:

"For all outgoing UDP packets on eth0 with destination port 28784 (HAP),
that have not been marked with 0x1, send them to queue number 2"

Rule 15:

"For all outgoing UDP packets on eth0 with destination port 28784 (HAP),
that have been marked with 0x1, accept"

Rule 16:

"For all outgoing packets on eth0, set the TTL to 255"

Rule 17:

"For all outgoing TCP packets on eth0, send them to queue number 3"
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Table 3.2: Temporary settings configured in configure_emulator.sh and their description.
Parameter

Modified via

mtu

The Maximum Transmission Unit is used to control
the maximum segment size
"ifconfig" command
552
(MSS) of the TCP segments.
The MTU equals the MSS
plus 40 bytes.

hw ether

Defines the Ethernet address
of the Internet facing interface
"ifconfig" command
00:e0:62:60:46:25
to be within the vendor’s prefix range.

icmp_ratelimit

/proc/sys/net/ipv4/
icmp_ratelimit

Defines the wait time between
ICMP replies from the inter- 0
face.

/proc/sys/net/ipv4/
tcp_sack

Controls the use of TCP Selective Acknowledgments in
TCP connections. Configura- 0
tion is either enabled (1) or
disabled (0).

tcp_sack

Description

Value

Controls the use of TCP win/proc/sys/net/ipv4/
dow scaling on TCP connectcp_window_scaling
0
tcp_window_scaling tions. Configuration is either
enabled (1) or disabled (0).

tcp_timestamps

3.2.3.3

/proc/sys/net/ipv4/
tcp_timestamps

Controls the use of TCP
timestamps on packets from
the kernel stack. configuration 0
is either enabled (1) or disabled(0).

start_emulator.sh.

Start_emulator.sh is the single starting point for the emulator from which all other
scripts and processes are started. This script first executes the two configuration scripts
(iptables_rules.sh and configure_emulator.sh), builds and runs the C programs, and then
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starts the Python modules. This process control script is used when changes are made to
program header files (.h files)to alter certain parameters (such as the device ID, used to
identify log entries for a specific honeypot in a the remote log).
3.2.3.4

start_emulator_no make.sh.

This process control script is identical to the start_emulator.sh script, but does not
build the C programs. This saves time during test execution because building executables
natively from C source on the Gumstix can take about a minute.
3.2.3.5

stop_emulator.sh.

This process control script stops all processes and flushes the iptables rules. It does
not, however return the parameters changed by configure_emulator.sh back to their original
values.
3.2.4

Custom User-space Processes.

Of the seven custom processes, six involve network packet manipulation for
recognizing different types of queries and responding appropriately. As a result, these
processes revolve tightly around the iptables firewall (the seventh process is used to
generate simulated input/output data to/from the device to act like a real PLC, discussed
in a Section 3.2.4.4). Figure 3.1 depicts the entire routing process of packets in the PLC
emulator system through the iptables firewall and Linux kernel. This diagram gives a full
view of all processes to clarify the complex path a single query-response packet interaction
takes through the emulator system.
3.2.4.1

infilter.o.

The purpose of the infilter.o process is to identify Nmap OS fingerprinting packets,
and deal with them according to a complex set of rules. This separate process is necessary
because the level of filtering and mangling required to identify and handle fingerprinting
packets reaches far beyond the functionality that iptables is able to provide.
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Figure 3.1: Routing of packets in the PLC emulator system. If the packet matches the listed
iptables rules, the packet will be diverted to the side path, if the packet does not match the
rule, it continues to the next iptables rule until a match is made, or until it reaches the end
of the iptables chain, in which case the packet will be rejected.
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The infilter.o process is written in C and receives packets from iptables NFQUEUE
target queue number 1 (according to iptables rules 3, 4, 9, and 10) before they are sent to
the Linux kernel TCP/IP stack for routing. Its functionality is depicted in Figure 3.2. If the
received packets are identified as OS fingerprinting packets, they are dropped to prevent
them from continuing deeper into the Linux kernel stack. Based on the contents of the
dropped fingerprinting packet, infilter.o crafts a new packet from scratch to send back to the
scanning PC. This new packet contains appropriate Ethernet, IP, and TCP or UDP headers
to ensure it is correctly routed back to the scanning PC, but incorporates scan response
data from the actual target PLC to fool the Nmap scanner into thinking the emulator is the
target PLC. This functionality is sometimes called packet mangling. If the query packets
are not dropped by infilter.o, two response packets would be sent to the scanner, one from
the Linux kernel stack, and one from infilter.o, which is highly undesirable. If the packet
is not identified as an Nmap OS probe scan packet, the packet is accepted by infilter.o, and
continues on its way to the next iptables rule.
3.2.4.2

outfilter.o.

The purpose of the outfilter.o process is to alter parameters in the IP packet header
that are not configurable otherwise. Though iptables has the capacity to change certain OSI
layer 2 fields such as the IP TTL field, many fields such as the IP ID cannot be changed
by iptables. Therefore, outfilter.o is required for modification of arbitrary header fields in
outgoing packets. The functionality of outfilter.o is depicted in Figure 3.3.
The outfilter.o process is written in C and receives packets from iptables NFQUEUE
target queue number 2 (according to iptables rules 12 and 14) before they enter the
Linux kernel TCP/IP stack routing mechanism. This process increases the accuracy of
the emulation by changing header fields to match those of the target PLC. To match
functionality of the target PLC, the outfilter.o process only changes the IP ID of the packets
to zero. The iptables rules match output packets destined for the querying computer
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Figure 3.2: Example packet flow for Nmap OS probes for both query packets (green)
and response packets (orange). The upper (green) portion of iptables contains input rules
that match query packets, while the lower (red) portion contains output rules that match
response packets.

originating from the webserver.py or ecom_svr.o processes where responses are created
from queries. If the output packets match rule 12 or 14, the IP ID is changed to zero and
the packets are re-injected back into iptables starting with the next rule. The functionality
of this processes is scalable to change any byte of any outgoing packet (not just the IP ID)
to match the output of any target PLC.
3.2.4.3

ecom_svr.o.

The purpose of the ecom_svr.o process is to receive HAP protocol queries from a
user on UDP port 28784, and generate responses to those queries in the same way as the
target PLC. The functionality of ecom_svr.o is depicted in Figure 3.4. This is the core of
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Figure 3.3: Example packet flow for a packet that has its IP ID changed by outfilter.o.

the industrial protocol interface and defines all of the protocol functionality for the HAP
industrial protocol. Process development requirements for deep protocol dissection, reverse
engineering, and low-level memory manipulations make this process the most complex,
and warrant further description. Though many standard functions of the protocol are
implemented, it is only a subset of the total capability of the HAP protocol. A complete list
of the functions that are implemented is located in Appendix E.
The ecom_svr.o process is written in C using the Libpcap Application Programming
Interface (API) to receive packets, and Libnet API to send packets.

An initial

implementation of this processes was developed in Python using the Scapy network packet
module, but early testing on the Gumstix platform showed that this configuration was too
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Figure 3.4: Example packet flow for a query and response from ecom_svr.o. Query packets
(green) are received by the process from the iptables firewall rules. Appropriate responses
(orange) are formed by the process and sent back into the iptables firewall to be sent to the
querying computer.

slow, causing the querying software on the user workstation to timeout. The early decision
to use the Libpcap and Libnet libraries over standard Linux UDP sockets is arbitrary, and
the ecom_svr.o process could easily be modified to utilize Linux UDP sockets if the Libpcap
or Libnet APIs are not available.
To aid in the development of the HAP emulator, the source for an API from
Host Engineering must be obtained [Hos12]. The API (written in C) is intended for
developing applications that communicate with HAP systems, such as the target PLC. This
functionality of this software had to be reversed to make it communicate with HAP software
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interfaces. The most important piece of information obtained from the API source is the
HAP.h header file that included data structure definitions used throughout the target PLC.
The acquisition of the API source code enables rapid development of the HAP
emulator, but does not trivialize its implementation. The HAP protocol is used on all
Koyo PLCs to encapsulate several other industrial protocols (described in Section 2.2.2)
over traditional IT infrastructure, giving it a great deal of flexibility, but also adds to
the importance of a thorough understanding of the protocol. Deep protocol dissection
using packet captures of real HAP traffic are tedious but critical to troubleshooting and
understanding the protocol well enough to create an accurate emulator.
The ecom_svr.o process is compiled from two separate source files that divide the
core network functions. The packet_rcv.c source file uses the Libpcap API to receive
query packets (that have arrived via iptables rule 8), validate them, and decide what the
appropriate response to the query should be. Once packet_rcv.c decides a response it passes
execution to functions in the packet_send.c source file. The packet_send.c functions then
create responses from scratch including custom HAP checksums and sequence numbers.
The packet_send.c process then uses the Libnet API to encapsulate the HAP protocol data
into UDP/IP response packets, and send them out of UDP port 28784 where they eventually
arrive at the iptables output rules, and back out to the querying computer.
User Interfaces to the ecom_svr.o(HAP protocol emulator). To access the functionality of the HAP protocol there are three tools considered. Two are manufacturer’s tools,
NetEdit3 and DirectSOFT5 Programming, and the third is a non-standard tool to exploit
vulnerabilities in the protocol, Metasploit. Despite the fact that these three interfaces to the
HAP protocol emulator are the focus of this research, any software that follows the HAP
industrial protocol specification should be able to access the emulator.
NetEdit3 .

This tool is used to view and set parameters related to the communication

and operation of the device, and is available free from the target PLC manufacturer [Hos12].
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A screenshot of the NetEdit3 tool displaying three devices, two of them emulated, is shown
in Figure 3.5. The real (target) PLC has Ethernet address that ends in 23. The ecom_svr.o
process that runs the HAP protocol emulator is intended to respond to queries in the same
manner as the target PLC. The NetEdit3 tool communicates with devices on UDP port
28784 through both broadcast and addressed IP traffic depending on the parameter being
accessed. This tool is chosen as a primary focus because of the straightforward interface it
provides to the target PLC and emulator.

Figure 3.5: NetEdit3 interface communicating using the HAP industrial protocol. Shown
are three devices, one real PLC (ID 5) and two emulated PLCs (ID 6, 7). The emulated
PLCs are also denoted with an ’F’ in the Name column for easy identification (’F’ for fake,
’R’ for real).

DirectSOFT5.

The primary programming interface to Koyo brand PLCs, including

the target PLC, is the DirectSOFT5 package. The manufacturer provides the DirectSOFT5
software free for limited use from its website [Aut12c]. This software allows direct access
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to the device memory (which may be password protected) enabling a user to read and write
arbitrary memory segments, view status of PLC switches and coils, and download and
upload ladder logic programs. There are hundreds of different commands that can be sent
to the device using this software, but only a few of the most critical are implemented in
the emulator. To support the superficial level of accuracy, the emulator can be locked and
unlocked with a 7-digit password and allows the ladder logic program to be downloaded
from the device, exactly like the target PLC. The emulator also supports viewing a dynamic
representation of the ladder logic that displays the constantly changing state of the PLC.
The dynamic representation feature of the emulator makes it look as though the
emulator is actually controlling a process as the switches, coils, and timers in the ladder
logic view change. Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.7 show screenshots of DirectSOFT5 being used
to view the changing status of the control elements on the emulator. The fields highlighted
are coils and switches that are currently active. The dynamic functionality is controlled by
the output_simulator.py process discussed in Section 3.2.4.4, and is readily configurable.

Metasploit. The final interface to HAP industrial protocol is the Metasploit
exploitation tool [Met12].

This is a popular, open-source, extensible tool used for

exploiting vulnerabilities in computer systems. It is used as a penetration testing tool
to identify and correct vulnerabilities in IT systems. The use of Metasploit is extending
beyond traditional IT however, and security researchers are actively developing Metasploit
modules to exploit vulnerabilities in SCADA devices as well.

A screenshot of the

Metasploit module successfully obtaining the password from the emulator device is
shown in Figure 3.8. The target Koyo PLC is one such device that has a Metasploit
exploit available that uses brute force to crack the HAP protocol password that would
normally be entered through the DirectSOFT5 interface giving full, unrestricted access
to the device [Wig12]. The application of the device password is described in Section
3.2.4.3. The password vulnerabilities, listed with ICS-CERT in January 2012 include weak
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Figure 3.6: DirectSOFT 5 programmer interfacing with the HAP protocol emulator. When
the Status button is depressed, the emulator displays a dynamic view of the current state of
the PLC ladder logic.

authentication and unlimited attempts with no lockout period [Dhs12]. The vulnerabilities
are corrected with firmware version 4.0.1776 dated 26 March 2012. Firmware versions
4.0.1735 and 4.0.1745 are confirmed to have this vulnerability. The vulnerability of the
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Figure 3.7: Status of emulator ladder logic a few moments later. Observe the alternate state
(highlighting shows an electrically closed connection).

target PLC with firmware version 4.0.1735 is implemented on the emulator to ensure that
the emulated device fails in the same way as the target PLC. Though this software is not
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the most current, it is feasible for outdated, insecure software to be loaded on a PLC, as
discussed in Chapter 2.

Figure 3.8: Metasploit exploit software brute-forcing the password on the emulator.
Metasploit found the password to be A0000322, and will unlock the device.

3.2.4.4

Dependencies of ecom_svr.o (HAP protocol emulator).

In addition to the executable, there are several configuration files and a helper
executable, output_simulator.py used to make the emulator more accurate, configurable,
and scalable. By removing as many configuration options as possible from the executables
and into dedicated files, settings can be changed without the need to re-compile the
emulator binary files.
config.txt.

This configuration file is used to keep track of stateful parameters such

as the device name, ID, firmware version, and password. In total, there are 437 different
parameters that can be manipulated to give the emulator the desired characteristics. The
HAP protocol emulator reads and writes all parameters to config.txt. Therefore, many
config.txt files can be made ahead of time with different system configurations and selected
at a later time to give the emulator any personality just by replacing the config.txt file.
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To provide consistency, config.txt is also used by the webserver.py process. When
asked to serve or change data, webserver.py also consults config.txt to ensure changes made
with one interface are immediately readable by the other interface.
ccmdictionary.txt and kseqdictionary.txt. These files are dictionaries of queryresponse fields that are used often by the emulator based on two different protocols,
DirectNet (aka CCM), and K-Sequence. DirectNet is an open industrial protocol used by
Koyo devices to read and write memory values on the target PLC discussed in Section 2.2.2.
On this particular target PLC, the DirectNet protocol (encapsulated in the HAP protocol)
is used to exchange CPU identification information to NetEdit3 and DirectSOFT5, as well
as provide the dynamic status representation described in Section 3.2.4.3, Figure 3.6, and
Figure 3.7. K-Sequence is a proprietary protocol used by Koyo devices to read and write
memory values on the target PLC. On the target PLC, the K-Sequence protocol (also
encapsulated in the HAP protocol) is used to exchange large amounts of data quickly, such
as the ladder logic program. The dictionary files can be thought of as a way to emulate
different memory locations on the PLC. That is, when a query is received, the emulator
reads or writes to the file as if it were memory on the target PLC.
Both the ccmdictionary.txt and kseqdictionary.txt files contain a "query = response"
format that ecom_svr.o uses to decide which message to send in response to a query for the
protocol. For example, when ecom_svr.o receives a query that contains a CCM message
of "1e01010132", it responds with the CCM payload of "00000b" as dictated by the entry
in ccmdictionary.txt. An excerpt from ccmdictionary.txt is provided in Figure 3.9, showing
this "query = response" format. Though not shown, kseqdictionary.txt works exactly the
same, but the queries and responses are much longer.
output_simulator.py. The small output_simulator.py helper process is written in
Python and changes several response values in ccmdictionary.txt in specific ways to
simulate changing memory values. Since ccmdictionary.txt is used to emulate memory
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[CCM_READ]
1e01010132 = 00000b
1e01010133 = 000000
1e01010333 = 000007
1e01810133 = 000000
1e04010031 = 000000000000
1e01777736 = 60000
1e010f0036 = 00005a
1e06ee0f31 = 0000000000000000
1e01840132 = 000000
Figure 3.9: Excerpt from ccmdictionary.txt

locations, the responses modified by output_simulator.py correspond to the locations in
memory on the PLC that keep track of the current status of its coils, switches, and counters.
The way that output_simulator.py modifies ccmdictionary.txt is not arbitrary. The values
specifically reflect valid operation according the ladder logic that is stored on the emulator.
That is, the simulated values follow the logic to represent real functionality of some real
control process. By altering this process, the emulator can appear to be controlling any
type of system desirable for the particular emulator application.
Even though the values of the current state of the coils, switches, and counters are
stored in ccmdictionary.txt, the actual ladder queries the emulator for its ladder logic
program, ecom_svr.o simply retrieves the values from kseqdictionary.txt. Therefore, to
send back a different ladder logic program to DirectSOFT5, values for a different ladder
logic program must be recorded, and placed into kseqdictionary.txt. Different methods for
accomplishing this are left for future work and discussed in Section 6.4
3.2.5

logging.o.

The purpose of the logging.o process is to send a copy of all packets arriving and
departing from the Internet facing interface of the emulator to a remote Syslog server via
the LAN facing interface on the emulator. Iptables has a built-in logging capability, but only
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logs the packet headers, and not the complete packet. This is not suitable for maintaining a
complete record of activity on the emulator required for honeypot applications, therefore,
logging.o is required to log all bytes of every packet coming from, or going to the emulator.
The functionality of logging.o is depicted in Figure 3.10.

Figure 3.10: Example packet flow packet logging both query packets (green) and response
packets (orange) in logging.o.

The logging.o process is written in C and receives packets from the iptables queue
number 3 at two different times in a query-response interaction (according to iptables rules
1 and 17). According to iptables rule 1, packets are sent to queue 3 before they are sent to
the Linux kernel TCP/IP stack for process routing. Similarly, according to iptables rule 17,
packets are sent to queue 3 after they leave the Linux kernel TCP/IP stack for routing back
to the querying computer, but before they are transmitted on the wire. After the packets
are logged by logging.o, the packets are re-injected back into iptables starting with the

57

next rule, or in the case of rule 17, are sent to the kernel for transmission to the querying
computer.
3.2.6

webserver.py.

The purpose of the webserver.py process is to emulate the HTTP web server
functionality of the target PLC. The webserver interface on the device allows for reading
and writing of many of the same industrial control settings and communication parameters
as the HAP protocol interface, and more. The webserver interface is valuable to a user
because no special tools (such as NetEdit3) are required to set or view the parameters; any
web browser can be used to access the website. As a universal portal to the target device,
the emulated webserver service implemented by webserver.py is critical to the accuracy of
the PLC emulator. The functionality of the webserver.py process is depicted in Figure 3.11.

Figure 3.11: Example query-response flow for a web request from webserver.py.
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Python is a natural choice for implementation of the web server because of its
extensive collection of modules that make implementation of a generic web server easy.
However, to accurately emulate the target PLC’s web server, extensive modifications are
made to the base HTTP web server. One example of a required modification is the
number and format of the HTTP error messages. On the target PLC no error messages
are sent to the browser— the webserver simply times out (not robust). The webserver.py
process suppresses these messages and overrides other imported classes to create a custom
webserver environment. The ease of changing these types of operations, as well as
the existing Python runtime environment, make a Python webserver a good choice for
industrial control emulators over other web servers like Apache. A screenshot of the main
webpage served by the emulator is shown in Appendix E.
The webserver.py process uses template .html pages to serve static pages to the web
browser. This strategy allows a single template for each webpage whose fields are filled in
just before the page is sent back to the web browser.
Similar to ecom_svr.o, only select functionality of the webserver is implemented into
the emulator. A complete list of all functions implemented, including those implemented by
webserver.py is located in Appendix D. Though not all available functions are operational,
every form and entry field on the website is stateful. For example, although the email
functionality of the target PLC is not implemented in the emulator, the email fields such as
the email server address, sever port, and timeout values can be saved and retrieved later.
3.2.7

modbus.py.

The purpose of this Python process is to emulate generic Modbus protocol
functionality in the industrial control emulator. It is a direct integration from a previous
research effort conducted by Dustin Bermen in 2012 [Ber12]. His Master’s thesis titled
"Emulating Industrial Controls System devices Using Gumstix Technology" contains the
implementation details of the modbus.py process.
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3.3

Incorporation of Design Considerations
The PLC emulator is designed primarily as a tool for studying the SCADA/ICS attack-

landscape as a ICS honeypot. An emulator that accurately implements communication
protocols and services has applications in laboratory research and educational environments
as well (discussed in Appendix A.1), but this design remains focused on implementation
of a SCADA/ICS landscape research honeypot. As a result, all design considerations
discussed in Section 3.1 play a significant role in the implementation.
3.3.1

Accuracy.

To develop an accurate emulation that responds to service queries in the same manner
as the target PLC, it is first necessary to decide how many layers of accuracy are necessary
to feel authentic. The Modbus service is not considered because this research focuses
on higher-level application protocols. Therefore, only the web and HAP protocols are
evaluated for accuracy based on the tools that are frequently used with the target PLC.
Five levels of accuracy emulated– (1) superficial accuracy, (2) packet accuracy, (3) timing
accuracy, (4) scanning tool accuracy, and (5) attack tool accuracy. In other words, the
emulator feels authentic when a user:
1. looks at the website or uses a manufacturer tool to view HAP data,
2. looks at packet bytes associated with the standard types of web or HAP queries,
3. measures the timing associated with queries and responses,
4. conducts an OS fingerprint scan on the device to see that the results tell the same
story as the webpage, and
5. executes a publicly-available exploit for a known vulnerability on the device.
The two emulated services, web and HAP, are subdivided into standard, and nonstandard types of interactions. The emulator then provides accurate responses for these four
different query request types to feel authentic: (1) standard web request type (browser), (2)
non-standard web request type (Nmap scan), (3) standard HAP request type (NetEdit3),
and (4) non-standard HAP request type (Metasploit module), defined as follows:
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1. Standard Web queries are interactions with the web server which is listening on
TCP port 80. The queries represent normal, within-bounds requests from an Internet
Explorer web browser.
2. Non-standard Web queries are OS fingerprinting scans using the Nmap tool that
attempt identification of the device based on the response to non-standard TCP, IP,
and ICMP packets sent to the device. By default, Nmap chooses the lowest open
TCP port on the device to perform its tests on, and therefore will always pick TCP
port 80 unless told otherwise.
3. Standard HAP queries are interactions with the HAP industrial protocol server which
is listening on UDP port 28784. These queries represent normal, within-bounds
requests from the free manufacturer tool, NetEdit3.
4. Non-Standard HAP queries are attacks on the HAP protocol security measures
using the koyo_login Metasploit module to exploit vulnerabilities found by Project
Basecamp.
The emulator is designed to mimic responses to each type of request as accurately as
possible when compared to the target PLC.
The HAP service provides two additional levels of superficial accuracy beyond the
Metasploit attack. After logging into the device using the password from the Metasploit
attack, the DirectSOFT5 software downloads firmware from the emulator (first additional
level) through the ecom_svr.o process. When the user attempts to view the current status
of coils and switches, the emulator provides a dynamic view of the ladder logic as its
values fluctuate as depicted in Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.7 (second additional level). Being
superficial levels of accuracy, they are subjective and difficult to quantify and therefore are
not tested in this research.
Among all the emulator design considerations, accuracy is the most difficult to
measure and quantify. Chapter 4, describes the method used in this research for quantifying
the accuracy of the emulator implementation.
3.3.2

Robustness.

Robustness is also an important consideration for the design. Since the device is
implemented completely in software, there is minimal risk to bricking the device to the
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point of un-usability. The target PLC has several DoS vulnerabilities that render the
webserver unusable for a period of several minutes as described in the January 2012
ICS-CERT notification [Dhs12]. These vulnerabilities include webserver buffer overflow
and resource exhaustion. The device is protected against the known and reproducible
vulnerabilities of the target PLC which including the resource exhaustion vulnerabilities.
However, not enough information is known about the buffer overflow conditions to
reproduce them on the target PLC and therefore, emulate its functionality. Because the
emulator is implemented on a different architecture (presumably in a different manner), it
is very unlikely that the emulator suffers the same vulnerability. While this is good news
for emulator robustness, it means that the emulator does not accurately represent the buffer
overflow vulnerability.
In support of accuracy and robustness, the emulator appears to fail under the
conditions of the resource exhaustion vulnerability, but does not actually fail. To make
a more accurate emulation, the emulator is configurable via the webserver.py Python
script to block for several minutes, just like the target PLC. With additional research and
improvements, the device can be made to emulate the buffer overflow vulnerability in a
similar, configurable way.
3.3.3

Cost Considerations.

Existing methods of implementing a SCADA/ICS honeypot involve using real PLCs,
(discussed in Section 2.5) which dramatically increases cost. The design implemented for
this thesis research lowers these costs significantly though the use of the Gumstix platform.
The cost and features of the Gumstix device are described in Section 2.4. Because the
emulator software is easily copied to other Gumstix or Linux computers, a single design
can be used to emulate an entire network, compounding the cost savings as the number of
devices increases.
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The Gumstix platform is a cost-effective solution with respect power budgets as well
[Gum12c]. Because of the low power consumption of an embedded platforms, the Gumstix
computer can even run on batteries, making the device portable and rapidly deployable.
Additional cost effective solutions are suggested in the Section 6.1.
3.3.4

Configurability.

The more configurable the emulator, the more portable to other applications it will
be. However, this implementation only emulates the DirectLogic 405 PLC. From a singledevice standpoint, the emulator is very configurable. Every stateful web or HAP field can
be modified and customized for the particular research or educational application du jour.
3.3.5

Scalability.

Because the emulator is designed primarily as a honeypot and can be potentially integrated into a honeynet, both scalability and code portability are important considerations.
The choice to use Linux is a result of selecting to uses the Gumstix single-board computer.
Using Linux gives the device the ability to run on many hardware configurations due to
it being highly customizable. Furthermore, the use of Linux allows the integration of the
very powerful iptables firewall.
3.3.6

LoggingAbility.

Logging is a critical function for an ICS field device emulator applied as a honeypot.
This implementation uses the second Ethernet port on the Gumstix device to send out-ofband logging to a remote Syslog server, an open-source Linux based program for largescale enterprise logging. By using a robust, scalable logging service, potentially hundreds
of emulators creating log entries as part of a large SCADA/ICS honeynet could be managed
with a few entries in a Syslog configuration file.
Because of its importance to SCADA/ICS attack-landscape research, the logging
ability of this emulator implementation is directly measured and assessed.
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Chapter

4, describes the method used for quantifying the logging ability of the emulator
implementation, and the results of the experiments are analyzed in Chapter 5.
3.4

Summary
The design of an industrial control emulator is complex. Depending on the intended

application, many design elements including accuracy, robustness, cost, configurability,
scalability and record keeping must be considered. The emulator implementation for
this research effort incorporates all of these considerations for applications in exploratory
SCADA/ICS attack-landscape research into design of the PLC emulator based on the
emulation target, the Koyo DirectLogic 405 PLC.
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IV.

4.1

Experimental Methodology

Goals
As discussed in Chapter 3, accuracy and authenticity are important design consider-

ations for an emulator designed for exploratory Internet research as a honeypot. The goal
of this experiment is to quantify accuracy and logging capability of the emulator to assess
its usefulness as an attack-landscape research device. Six questions about the accuracy and
logging performance of the emulator on the Gumstix and PC platforms are addressed:
1. To what extent are the responses from standard queries accurate at the packet level
for the emulator compared to the target PLC?
2. To what extent are the responses from non-standard queries from scanning and attack
tools accurate for the emulator compared to the target PLC?
3. To what extent are the timing of responses for standard and non-standard queries
accurate for the emulator compared to the PLC?
4. To what extent are the queries and responses to and from the emulator logged?
5. To what extent does request frequency affect the accuracy and timing performance
of the emulator?
6. How significant is the impact of running the emulator on the Gumstix platform versus
the PC platform for all five of the above categories?
4.2

Approach
This is accomplished by methodically dividing the goal into testable and quantifiable

experiments. Chapter 3 previously defined accuracy at five levels: superficial, packet,
scanning, attack, and timing. Therefore to quantify accuracy, the experiments include
scenarios designed to test each of these levels independently.
The emulator is divided into two services, web and HAP. Both are subdivided by
the types of interactions the emulator is designed to handle: (1) web standard, (2) web
non-standard, (3) hap standard, (4) hap non-standard. These reflect interactions with the
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emulator via web browser, Nmap, NetEdit3, and Metasploit respectively. The services and
query types are summarized in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1: Two services broken into
four query types.
Service Query Type
Web

Tool

Standard

Browser

Non-Standard

Nmap

Standard

NetEdit3

HAP

Non-Standard Metasploit

The approach to test accuracy of the emulator on both the Gumstix and PC platforms
is to send identical queries to each of the Gumstix, PC, and target PLC configurations in
different experimental scenarios to cover all aspects of accuracy and logging. A comparison
of the responses to these queries is made between the target PLC and both emulator
platforms. Additionally, the completeness of the number of log entries is assessed to
determine the ability of the emulator to successfully log all query-response interactions. To
ensure complete coverage for accuracy testing, Table 4.2 maps the five levels of accuracy
to the services in Table 4.1. In this experiment, packet-level accuracy is considered to be a
more rigorous determination on authenticity than superficial (or visual) accuracy, and thus
superficial accuracy is not measured.
It is hypothesized that the industrial controls emulator implemented on both the
Gumstix and PC platforms is (1) accurate to both standard and non-standard queries at
the five levels when compared to the target PLC, and (2) able to log all packets to a
remote logging service. A comparison of target PLC and emulated system quantifies the
accuracy of the emulator and forms the basis for a qualitative determination on authenticity,

66

Table 4.2: Levels of accuracy mapped to emulator services.
Levels of Accuracy
Request Types
HAP Web

Superficial Packet Timing Scanning Attack
Standard(browser)

X

X

Non-Standard(Nmap)
Standard(NetEdit3)

X
X

X

Non-Standard(Metasploit)

X

X

X
X

X

as describe in Chapter 3. That is, the more accurate the emulator, the more authentic
interactions with it will feel to the user.
4.3

System Boundaries
The system under test (SUT), shown in Figure 4.1, is the PLC Control System

consisting of the industrial network interface connecting the PLC device to the Internet, the
Logging Interface where the emulator connects to the logging server, and the PLC device
itself. The PLC device component is the component under test (CUT) and is controlled by
the PLC device Type parameter. Depending on the experimental scenario, the CUT is at
one of three levels, (1) the target PLC to define baseline metrics, (2) the emulator running
on the Gumstix platform, or (3) the emulator running on the PC platform.

4.4

Services and Outcomes
There are four services the system provides as discussed in Chapter 3, three Internet

services and a logging service. The Internet services include (1) a web service that enables
configuration of the device through an interactive interface, (2) a HAP protocol service
that allows direct access to module memory including programmable logic (ladder logic)
of the device as well as configuration, and (3) a generic Modbus service used to control
functionality of the device. The logging service (4) provides a record of incoming and
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Figure 4.1: PLC control system

outgoing packets (sent to and from the three Internet services) in emulator experiments.
Only the web, HAP, and logging services are considered because the scope of this research
concentrates on higher application-level protocols. The process that runs the Modbus
service was developed as an independent research effort [Ber12]. The validity of this
software module is not tested beyond general functionality before integration into the ICS
field device emulator.
The logging service is provided while the PLC device component is at either of the
two emulator levels, the Gumstix platform or the PC platform. There is no logging on
the target PLC device, but logging is a critical function of an ICS field device emulator
designed for honeypot applications, as described in Section 3.3.6.
4.5

Parameters and Factors
Two types of parameters are considered in this experiment, Workload Parameters

and System Parameters. Both types of parameters affect the performance of the SUT, as
measured by the metrics. Varied parameters are called factors. Levels are the values or
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conditions at which each factor is held during an experiment. In this section, experimental
elements are introduced and justified as they apply to this SUT. A summary of chosen
factors and their levels is listed in Table 4.4.
4.5.1

Workload Parameters and Factors.

The workload is Internet traffic most likely to be sent to a real PLC by users in
cyber sensing, laboratory, and educational applications. Since any traffic to a honeypot
is suspicious as discussed in Chapter 2, any traffic and therefore any workload sent to the
system is treated as malicious. There are two workload parameters based on how a user
would submit workload requests to the SUT, Request Type and Request Frequency.
4.5.1.1

Request Type.

Depending on the user, different requests are made to the device. The Request Type
parameter defines four different workloads corresponding to the four different query types
sent to the system to represent different requests made by users to a standard PLC. These
four request types are selected because they are the most likely ways a user would interact
with the target PLC.
Request type is a factor in this experiment, and the levels are divided into four
categories according to Table 4.1: (1) web standard workload type, (2) web non-standard
workload type, (3) industrial standard workload type, and (4) industrial non-standard
workload type using the following definitions.
Web Standard Workload Requests.

The web standard workload request represents

a typical workload any user could submit to the webserver. This type of request would
be used in all emulator applications including cyber sensing, laboratory research, and
education.
The specific workload request chosen is to display the device homepage. A screenshot
of the homepage served from the emulator is available in Appendix E. On the homepage
(main.html), the current configuration of the device is displayed with hyperlinks to other
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pages where the configuration can be changed. This workload is chosen for the experiment
because the main.html file is sufficiently large as to force TCP segmentation. The maximum
segment size (MSS) of a TCP segment dictates the maximum amount of data that can
be sent in a single TCP packet. The MSS on the target PLC is 512 bytes while the
size of main.html is 1,932 bytes, this forces delivery of the page into four deterministic
TCP packets. Additionally, the serving complexity of main.html is higher than other
pages because of large numbers of memory read operations that pull information from
the emulated device’s configuration file to send in response to the query, as described in
Chapter 3.
As an alternative to a web browser such as Internet Explorer or Firefox, an automated
tool is created to generate web standard workload requests to obtain consistent results
between trials and configurations. This tool, written in C, uses raw TCP sockets to open
a connection to the CUT’s webserver, send the HTTP GET request, accept data, and
handle connection tear down. The tool is multi-threaded to allow an unlimited number
open sockets to the webserver at a time. This enables many simultaneous connections
without waiting for the previous GET request to have been handled by the CUT. Additional
information about this custom workload generator is available in Appendix G.
Web Non-standard Workload Requests. Beyond standard users, those interested
in exploiting the device are more likely to challenge it with different tests of accuracy
to determine its authenticity. A common approach is using a network scanner such as
Nmap and observing what is returned. If the results are consistent with what are expected,
authenticity is further established.
Using Nmap for the web non-standard workload request is a good choice because it
is popular, open-source, and free. Additionally, the documentation available is excellent,
which is a major enabler for the Nmap probe handling process (infilter.o) of the emulator
described in Chapter 3. Because of the default configuration of Nmap, the first open port
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found on a device is the port selected for OS fingerprinting probes. On the target PLC, this
is TCP port 80, the webserver. The basic command issued to Nmap to conduct a single
web non-standard workload request is:
nmap -sS -sU -p 1-65535 -T3 - -O -v - -max-parallelization 1
Industrial Standard Workload Requests.

Like the web standard workload request,

the industrial standard workload request represents a typical request a user submits to the
HAP protocol server on UDP port 28784. As described in Chapter 3, NetEdit3 can be used
to submit standard workloads to the CUT on this interface. This type of request would be
used in all emulator applications including SCADA attack-landscape research.
The specific request chosen is the request of the Module Description via the HAP
protocol. This workload is chosen for the experiment because the CUT responds with the
most bytes of any other HAP response (267 data bytes).
As an alternative to the proprietary NetEdit3 tool, an automated tool is also created
to generate standard industrial workload requests to obtain consistent results between
trials and configurations. This tool, written in C, uses raw UDP sockets to send the
query and receive for the response. The functionality is similar to the custom workload
generator developed for the standard web workload, and additional information is available
in Appendix G.
Industrial Non-standard Workload Requests.

Again, non-standard requests are sent

by those interested in exploiting the device. After a device has been identified, either
through information found on the website or via an Nmap scan, publicly-available exploits
may be attempted to verify authenticity of a device. A common tool used to execute
exploits is the Metasploit exploitation framework. An exploitable vulnerability gives more
authenticity to an emulated device by failing similarly to the target PLC
Metasploit is free, easy to use, and is ubiquitous among highly-skilled and lowerskilled hackers alike (because it is free and easy to use). Written in Ruby, the framework is
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easily extended making the addition of new exploits by anyone straightforward, which
is how the exploit for the target PLC was created [Wig12]. The module used is the
koyo_login.rb module. The module successfully exploiting the target PLC is seen in Figure
3.8. The exploit is executed through the Metasploit console:
$use auxiliary/scanner/scada/koyo_login
$set rhosts 10.1.0.79
$exploit
4.5.1.2

Request Frequency.

The request frequency workload parameter defines how quickly workload requests are
sent to the SUT. This metric is chosen because the rate at which the requests are sent by the
workload generator is easily reproduced by attackers trying to determine the true identity
of the device. The accuracy of the log generated by the SUT (if CUT is the emulator)
may be affected as the time in between requests decreases. Additionally, the elapsed time
and response rate metrics may be affected depending on the ability of the SUT to process
responses as fast as or faster than the request frequency. These are both experimental
questions outlined in Section 4.1.
Request Frequency is a factor in this experiment. All three devices are tested at
two levels, slow and PLC Break. Depending on the level of the Workload Request Type
factor, the standard and accelerated frequencies are different values. The levels chosen are
the result of pilot studies conducted on the system for each of the target PLC, Gumstix
emulator, and PC emulator platforms. These nominal levels are summarized in Table 4.3.
The Slow level is defined as the fastest rate that all three devices can handle
successfully, without dropping requests. The PLC Break level is defined as the fastest
rate that the target PLC can handle without failing to respond to queries. In addition to
these levels, a level only performed on the emulators is called the Emulator Break level. To
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Table 4.3: Selected nominal request frequency levels for all four types of frequency
requests. These levels are a result of pilot studies.

Slow(query/sec) PLC Break(query/sec)

Emulator Break (query/sec)
PC

Gumstix

Standard Web

10

27.49

203.198

10.263

Standard HAP

100

382.203

2023.976

259.238

Non-Standard Web

T3†

T5‡

n/a

n/a

Non-Standard HAP

0.637

2.066

1328.643

2273.404

†timing: Standard T3 Nmap Speeds plus options: -max-parallelism 1 -max-scan-delay 5 -max-retries 2
‡timing: Insane T5 Nmap Speeds plus options: -max-scan-delay 1 -max-retries 2
NOTE: this is not the frequency at which the PLC breaks, simply a faster Nmap scanning profile.

determine these values, the emulators are driven to their own break frequencies to establish
the maximum request frequency they can handle without failing to respond to queries.
As seen in Table 4.3, the Non-standard web request (Nmap scan) does not list specific
frequency values, only that the default Nmap timing profile (T3) plus options, and the
insane timing profile (T5) plus options are used. Because of the nature of the Nmap scan,
the true timing and parameters are trivial, and beyond the scope of this research. Defaultplus-option timing profiles are used to simplify the experiment since there are at least 10
variables that affect the frequency of probe packets sent by Nmap. Additionally, each Nmap
scan takes several minutes, and attempting to find the exact point that the scans begin to
fail is difficult and not productive to this research.
For the non-standard HAP workload, the slow level is the standard brute force
password attack as executed using the default Metasploit speed. In Metasploit, there are no
options to change the rate at which queries are made. Therefore, the tool tcpreplay [Syn12]
is used to record and play back the Metasploit attack packets at arbitrary speeds to facilitate
the PLC Break and Emulator Break request frequency levels. Again, pilot studies are used
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to determine the actual break levels for each CUT. The selected levels shown in Table 4.3
are those used in the actual experiments.
4.5.2

System Parameters and Factors.

Only the PLC device parameter is a factor in this experiment. Other parameters that are
not being considered but acknowledged as potentially significant are the device architecture
(Gumstix: ARM, PC: x86) and operating system (Gumstix: Angstrom 3.3.0, PC: Ubuntu
2.6.35)
4.5.2.1

PLC Device.

The PLC Device parameter defines the device that is plugged into the system. The
PLC Device parameter specifies which component under test (CUT) is in the system. The
PLC Device parameter is a factor being considered in this experiment. The PLC Device
parameter has three levels (1) target PLC, (2) emulated PLC on Gumstix platform, and (3)
emulated PLC on PC platform.

Table 4.4: Summary of Factors and Levels.
Factors

Levels
Slow

Request Frequency†

PLC Break
Emulator Break
Web Standard
HAP Standard

Request Type

Web Non-standard
HAP Non-standard
Target PLC
PLC Device

Emulated on Gumstix
Emulated on PC

†As assigned by Table 4.3 according to request types.
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4.6

Performance Metrics
There are no standard objective metrics for measuring the effectiveness of an emulator

to imitate its target device and therefore metrics are developed to quantify emulator
accuracy. A summary of the performance metrics measured for each request type and
corresponding levels of accuracy is shown in Table 4.5.
4.6.1

Packet Bytes.

The packet bytes metric measures the byte values of a response from the CUT to
a query. Packet level accuracy is determined by how many packet bytes of an emulator
response match the expected response bytes from the target PLC. In the SUT, packet bytes
are measured for two request types, (1) the web standard workload, and (2) the industrial
standard workload. Therefore, the metric is only measured during scenarios 1, 2, 2a, 5, 6,
6a, 9, 10, 10a, 13, 14, 14a, 15, 16, 16a, 17, 18, 21, 22 according to Appendix F.
The expected response of the emulator is defined as the response provided by the
PLC Control System when the target PLC device is in the system as the CUT. A baseline
response for the target PLC is measured for all other variable factors, and the response
under those same conditions is measured with the emulators in the system as the CUT to
determine the packet byte accuracy.
All deterministic bytes from the emulator response must be identical to the equivalent
bytes in a response from the target PLC for the emulator response to be 100%
accurate. Deterministic bytes in the Internet headers include parameters whose accuracy
is considered not relevant, including fields such as the query source port number, initial
sequence number, etc. The complete list of bytes considered non-deterministic in this
experiment is available in E. If all deterministic bytes are not identical, then the accuracy
is less than 100% for that query.
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4.6.2

Nmap OS Fingerprinting Fields.

The Nmap OS Fingerprinting Fields (hereafter referred to as Nmap fields) metric
measures selected values found in the output of an Nmap OS Fingerprint scan. Scan
level accuracy is determined by how many Nmap field values of a response from the
emulator match the expected field values from the target PLC for same scan. This metric
is only measured during the experiments that submit web non-standard queries to the CUT
(scenarios 3, 4, 11, 12, 19, 20 according to Appendix F).
The fields considered are the Port Status, OS Guesses, Scan Details, TCP sequence
Prediction (which is also reported as the SP field in the Scan Details section), IP ID
Sequence Generation. The results of an Nmap scan with these fields highlighted is seen
in Figure 4.2.
4.6.3

Successful Unlock.

The successful unlock metric measures whether the Metasploit exploit is successful,
or not. This metric is binary, either the device is successfully unlocked by the attack or it is
not. Attack level accuracy is determined by the outcome of the Successful Unlock metric.
This metric is only measured during the experiments that submit HAP non-standard queries
to the CUT (scenarios 7, 8, 8a, 15, 16, 16a, 23, 24 according to Appendix F).
4.6.4

Response Time.

The response time metric measures the time from when the first packet of the
workload is sent from the workload generator to the CUT, to when the final packet of
the response is sent from the CUT back to the workload generator. Timing accuracy
is obtained by comparing the measured baseline response times of the target PLC to
the measured performance of the emulator CUTs. This metric is measured during all
experiments. This is a common metric in network analysis and is of particular interest for
the emulator system because it is easy to measure by researchers, students, and attackers
alike. The measurement of elapsed time or latency has been shown to be a fingerprintable
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Figure 4.2: Example OS Fingerprint scan results. The values of the fields highlighted are
measured by the Nmap OS Fingerprinting fields metric.

characteristic in other computer service emulator systems such as the popular open-source
program Honeyd [FYC06].
4.6.5

Logging Ability.

The logging metric counts the number of Syslog packets sent from the emulator to
the remote Syslog server. Correct operation of the logging service requires that a Syslog
entry be created on the LAN- facing interface for every packet to and from the emulator
seen on the Internet-facing interface. Because capturing all emulator interactions is one of
the most important functions, the logging metric is a critical measurement. This metric is
measured during all experiments that submit queries to an emulator CUT(scenarios 1-16a
according to Appendix F). Since the emulator logging is out-of-band (meaning log traffic
77

travels across a different communication channel than the workload), no timing rate is
associated with the logging service. As long as all interactions are sent to the log allowing
time for send and receive buffers to clear, it is not important how long it takes for them to
get there. The method used to test this is described in Section 4.8.1.7.

Table 4.5: Performance metrics measured for each request type and corresponding levels
of accuracy.

Request Types
HAP Web

Levels of Accuracy
Standard(browser)

Packet

Timing

X

X

Non-Standard(Nmap)

X

Standard(NetEdit3)

X

Scanning

Attack

X
X

X

X

Non-Standard(Nmap)

Logging
Ability

X

X
X

X

Packet Bytes Response Time Nmap Fields Successful Logging
Unlock
Performance Metrics Measured

4.7

Experimental Design
A total of thirty query-response scenarios are divided into the four workload

components. Based on an expectation of relatively low variability in all three metrics,
this experimental setup is expected to result in 99% confidence intervals to determine
performance differences. A partial factorial design is used for this experiment because
the target PLC is only submitted to two request frequency levels, Slow and PLC Break. A
complete list of all scenarios and factors is listed in Appendix F.
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4.8

Evaluation Technique
4.8.1

Accuracy.

4.8.1.1

Standard Web Workload Packet-Level Accuracy.

The selected web standard workload queries are GET requests sent to the CUT to
retrieve the homepage, main.html. The response to these queries is measured by the Packet
Bytes metric. Scenarios examined during the web standard workload accuracy trials are
listed in Table 4.6. The baseline with the PLC Device at the Target PLC level is recorded in
scenarios 17 and 18 according to Appendix F. For every query, exactly 2,372 bytes across 8
packets are sent by the CUT including the TCP connection setup, data exchange, and TCP
connection teardown. Of these 2,372 bytes, 2,330 bytes are deterministic.

Table 4.6: Scenarios examined during the
Web Standard Workload.
Scenario

Request
Frequency
(queries/sec)

Platform

1

10

PC

2

27.124

PC

2a

203.198

PC

9

10

Gum

10

27.124

Gum

10a

10.263

Gum

17

10

PLC

18

27.124

PLC

With the PLC Device factor at the Emulated PLC levels (scenarios 1, 2, 2a, and 9,
10, 10a according to Appendix F) the results are again recorded. A binary comparison
(match or do not match) is then done between the deterministic bytes of these responses
to the baseline measurements taken for the Target PLC. A quantitative assessment is then
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made on packet-level accuracy for web standard queries. A depiction of the byte-by-byte
comparison between target and emulated PLC for all 8 packets of a response is shown in
Figure 4.3.

Figure 4.3: Example of byte-by-byte comparison of target PLC responses to emulator
responses for a homepage request query. The CUT responds with exactly 2,372 bytes
across 8 packets. 2,330 deterministic bytes are compared.

Because the response is always exactly the same for the same query, theoretically only
one trial is necessary to perform an assessment of packet-level accuracy. However, the
Response Time metric requires more trials. Therefore, with the ease of conducting trials
using the automated workload generator, a large number of trials is conducted, significantly
reducing the size of the confidence intervals for the Response Time metric, as well as
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provide confidence in packet-level accuracy. A total of 1000 trials of the web standard
workload are sent to each CUT. Based on an expectation of relatively low variability
in packet byte accuracy and timing accuracy, this experimental setup, a 99% confidence
interval (CI) is chosen to determine performance differences.
4.8.1.2

Standard HAP Workload Packet-Level Accuracy.

The HAP standard workload for the emulators is evaluated in exactly the same way
as the web standard workload. Scenarios examined during the HAP standard workload are
listed in Table 4.7. The baseline, with the PLC Device factor at the Target PLC level, is
done in scenarios 21 and 22. For every query, exactly 309 bytes in 1 UDP response packet
are sent by the CUT. Of these 309 bytes, 302 bytes are deterministic. With the PLC Device
at the Emulated PLC levels (scenarios 5, 6, 6a, and 13, 14, 14a according to Table 4.7) the
results are recorded and a binary comparison is again made to the baseline for 1000 trials.

Table 4.7: Scenarios examined during the
HAP Standard Workload.
Scenario

Request
Frequency
(queries/sec)

Platform

5

100

PC

6

382.203

PC

6a

2023.976

PC

13

100

Gum

14

382.203

Gum

14a

259.238

Gum

21

100

PLC

22

382.203

PLC
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4.8.1.3

Nmap OS Scanning-Level Accuracy.

The web non-standard workload response is evaluated similarly to the packet-level
accuracies just described, but Nmap fields are measured instead of packet bytes. Scenarios
examined during the web non-standard workload accuracy trials are listed in Table 4.8.
There are 113 fields in an Nmap OS Fingerprint scan across the five categories seen
previously in Figure 4.2. The baseline, with the PLC Device at the target PLC level, is
done in scenarios 19 and 20. With the PLC Device at the Emulated PLC levels (scenarios
3, 4, and 11, 12) the scan results are recorded and a binary comparison is done to the
baseline. All Nmap fields from the emulators should match the baseline.

Table 4.8: Scenarios examined during the
Web Non-standard Workload.
Scenario

Request
Frequency

Platform

3

T3(+options)

PC

4

T5(+options)

PC

11

T3(+options)

Gum

12

T5(+options)

Gum

19

T3(+options)

PLC

20

T5(+options)

PLC

Five scan trials are done to ensure validity of test results. The lengthy duration of
around 11 minutes for each scan and the complexity of the data output make it very
difficult to compare the results of many trials, which must be done manually. Based on
an expectation of relatively low variability in accuracy, this experimental setup is expected
to result in 99% CI to determine performance differences in accuracy based on the five
trials.
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4.8.1.4

Metasploit Attack-Level Accuracy.

The HAP standard workload response is evaluated simply by running the exploit under
each test configuration, and verifying that the exploit is successful. Scenarios examined
during the HAP non-standard workload accuracy trials are listed in Table 4.9. The workload
input values show the tcpreplay playback multiplier needed to generate the nominal request
frequency for the indicated scenario. Successes is determined using the DirectSOFT5
software; if the software asks for a password before downloading the ladder logic, then
the device is locked, otherwise if the software begins downloading the ladder logic without
asking for a password, the device is unlocked and the exploit was successful. For each
experimental scenario, the passwords of all devices are set to the same arbitrary value.
Similar to the Nmap OS Scans described in Section 4.8.1.3, five trials are conducted.
Based on an expectation of relatively low variability in attack-level accuracy, this
experimental setup is expected to result in 99% CI to determine performance differences in
accuracy based on the five trials.
4.8.1.5

Timing of Standard Requests.

Timing for standard requests is evaluated from packet capture timestamps, and
validated by outputs generated by the workload generators. The start reference for each
trial begins with the initial query packet’s timestamp and ends with the final packet of the
response.
For the web standard workload, the clock for an arbitrary query starts with the first
packet of the TCP handshake, and concludes with the final TCP ACK packet from the
CUT. The HAP standard workload is connectionless UDP with only one packet for every
query and one packet for every response. The clock starts with the timestamp of the query,
and ends with the timestamp of the response.
This data is collected at the same time as the packet byte level accuracy metrics.
Therefore, 1000 trials are conducted to provide a 99% CI for the response time for standard
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Table 4.9: Scenarios examined during the HAP Non-standard
Workload.
Scenario

Request
Frequency
(queries/sec)

Workload
Input Value

Platform

7

0.637

0.071

PC

8

2.066

0.2304

PC

8a

1328.643

500

PC

15

0.637

0.081

Gum

16

2.066

0.266

Gum

16a

2273.404

480

Gum

23

0.637

1

PLC

24

2.066

3.2555

PLC

requests. Based on low expected variability in the timing data, 99% CI is a reasonable
expectation based on the selected number of trials.
4.8.1.6

Timing of the Non-standard Requests.

Timing for the HAP non-standard (Metasploit) requests is evaluated the same way as
described in Section 4.8.1.5 for HAP standard workloads.
Timing for web non-standard requests is evaluated differently. Because the web nonstandard (Nmap) queries are collections of many packets and responses, time is measured
as the difference between the first packet sent by the workload generator and the last packet
sent by either the workload generator or the CUT as recorded in the packet capture of the
scan.
Because of the significant amount of time needed to conduct each test and low
expected variability, a minimal number of five trials is conducted to obtain confidence
intervals of 99% to compare response times of the respective non-standard workload
scenarios.
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4.8.1.7

Logging.

The logging metric records the number of log entries sent to the remote logging
server on the LAN-facing network interface via a packet capture program running on the
remote logging server. The number of packets sent is equal to the number of log entries
generated. Simultaneously, a packet capture program is running on the workload generator
recording all traffic going to and from the emulator. Every packet captured on the workload
generator going to or from the CUT should have a packet generated on the logging server.
The number of packets captured by each packet capture program is compared to make a
quantitative assessment on the ability of the CUT to generate log entries.
Performing rigorous statistical analysis on logging is difficult because the data is
pooled. When the number of log packets sent does not equal the number of query and
response packets sent, there is no easy way of determining which specific packet was not
logged. Therefore the analysis of the logging metric is limited to discussing the ratio of log
entries made to expected entries.
4.9

Experiment setup
To conduct this experiment, the operational system is implemented and measured

according to the diagram in Figure 4.4. A Dell Latitude D630 with 2GB RAM, Intel Core2
Duo CPU, 2.00GHz Processor, running Linux Ubuntu 2.6.35 is used as the CUT that runs
the emulator. This computer adds an additional Ethernet port via an SMC Networks USB
to Ethernet stick model number SMC2290USB/ETH. A second computer is running Linux
Ubuntu 3.2.0 used as both the workload generator and the response recorder. The computer
is also a Dell Latitude D630 loaded with VMWare Player 4.0.2 with a Windows XP SP3
virtual machine to run the NetEdit3 and DirectSOFT5 HAP tools. The computer is also
loaded with Nmap version 5.12 to generate the web Non-standard workload and receive
the response, and Metasploit version 4.4 to generate the HAP non-standard workload and
receive the response. The two custom workload generators for web standard and HAP
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standard are called htmlget_mt and hap_mt respectively. Wireshark version 1.8.1 packet
sniffer is used to measure the response accuracy and timing metrics. Instructions for setting
up the emulator are found in Appendix I.
A third computer running Ubuntu Linux version 11.10 with Syslogd server version
1.5.0 records the out-of-band logging from the emulated honeypot device, and is only
used during measurements that involve the emulator CUT. This computer is also running
Wireshark version 1.8.1 to record the number of logging packets sent to the logging server
from the CUT.

Figure 4.4: Experimental Setup.

The scope of this experiment is limited to a quantitative assessment of the emulator
to the Koyo DirectLogic DL405 PLC with firmware version 4.0.1735 for the four types of
workloads described, and the emulator’s logging capabilities.
4.10

Validation of Custom Tools
Because two custom workload generators are used to send and collect data from the

CUT, a tool validation is done to ensure that the tools represent valid data representative of
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what is sent by real tools. The workload generated by the custom web workload generator,
htmlget_mt, is compared to the workload sent by Internet Explorer version 9.0.8112 to
ensure similar queries are generated. Similarly, the custom HAP workload generator,
hap_mt, is validated against the NetEdit3 manufacturer tool.
In addition to workload tools, several custom packet capture parsing tools are
developed to automate packet and timing accuracy measurements described in Section
4.8 for the 1000 trials for standard workloads. Further details about the tools and their
validation are found in Chapter 5 and Appendix G.
4.11

Summary
This chapter describes the methodology used to quantify accuracy and logging

capability of the emulator. Four request types are used to test accuracy or the emulator
on four levels: packet, scanning, attack, and timing. These request types are conducted at
different request frequencies to determine the effects on accuracy and logging capability.
All scenarios are conducted on the target PLC to establish baseline values for the selected
metrics. The scenarios are then conducted on the PC and Gumstix measuring the same
metrics, which are compared to the baseline and each other.
It is hypothesized that the Gumstix and PC emulators are 100% accurate at the
packet, scanning, and attack levels for all request types and request frequencies. It is also
hypothesized that the response times of the Gumstix and PC emulators for all request types
and request frequencies are faster or equivalent to the target PLC. Finally, it is hypothesized
that all packets going to and from the Gumstix and PC emulators for all request types and
request frequencies are successfully logged.
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V.

Results and Analysis

This chapter discusses the results of the experiments described in Chapter 4. The
results show that the emulator on both the Gumstix and PC platforms are over 95% accurate
for web non-standard workloads (Nmap OS Scans) and over 99% accurate for all other
types of workloads. The logging capabilities of both platforms are also excellent, with
99.99% of all packets being logged by the PC and 97.21% of all packets being logged
by the Gumstix when the results of all scenarios are combined. Though the timing-level
accuracies for the PC platform are significantly faster than the target PLC, the results of the
Gumstix platform significantly slower as defined by the 99% confidence intervals for the
mean.
5.1

Validation of Custom Tools
The use of custom tools to generate the workload and parse the experimental data are

necessary because of the large number of scenarios and trials. Two workload generators
are used to produce the web and HAP standard workloads, htmlget_mt and hap_mt,
respectively whose function is described in Chapter 4. Validation is accomplished by
measuring the query and response using the custom web and HAP workload generators
and comparing them to browser and NetEdit3 interactions, respectively. The details of the
workload generators and their validation are in Appendix G.
In addition to custom workload generation tools, data parsers are necessary to parse
the packet captures (.pcap format) collected for each experiment. Three custom parsers are
developed: web_time_parse.py and udp_time_parse.py, for reading the packet timestamps,
and pcap_accuracy_parse.py to compare responses of two .pcap files to similar workloads
to determine differences in response bytes. The details of how the timing and accuracy
parsers work as well as their validation are in Appendix G.
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5.2

Packet Level Accuracy
Packet level accuracy only considers responses from the web standard queries and

HAP standard queries of both the Gumstix and PC platforms. Each scenario is repeated
1000 times to ensure consistency in packet level accuracy. The metric used to measure the
packet-level accuracy is the percentage of packet bytes correct which is a derived metric
based on the packet bytes metric. The percentage of packet bytes correct is the percentage
of packet byte values measured with the emulator in the system, compared to the baseline
packet byte values measured with the target PLC in the system. Both the Gumstix and PC
platforms are evaluated using this metric.
5.2.1

Gumstix Packet-Level Accuracy Results .

The results for packet-level accuracy as measured by the percent packets bytes correct
metric of the Gumstix and percentage of packets logged are shown in Table 5.1. The results
show that almost every byte of response is accurate on the Gumstix emulator for all 1000
of the standard web queries. There are a total of 2,432 bytes sent from actual and emulated
PLC servers for a single standard web query for the index.html page seen in Appendix E.
Excluding non-deterministic header fields also defined in Appendix E, there are 2,330 bytes
across eight packets that should be identical. Of these total bytes, the Gumstix emulator
differs by 5 bytes for a success rate of 99.79%. Four of these byte differences occur in
the TCP header for three packets of the response and are a result of how the target PLC’s
TCP/IP stack is implemented. These results are confirmed for all successful trials at all
three request frequency levels. For packet-level accuracy, there are no confidence intervals
because there is no variance among the trials conducted.
The differences between the Gumstix emulator and target PLC responses are in the
handling of the TCP Push flag and TCP congestion window and are not correctable outside
of the Linux kernel in the current emulator implementation. Figure 5.1 shows an example
of one of these differences manifested in packet 4 of the standard web response, indicated
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Table 5.1: Packet level accuracy and logging results for the Gumstix for
standard web and HAP workloads.
Scenario Service

Request
Frequency

Successful
trials

%packet %packets
bytes correct logged

9

Web

slow

1000/1000

99.79%

100.00%

10

Web

PLC Break

319/1000

99.79%

100.00%

10a

Web

Gum Break

1000/1000

99.79%

100.00%

13

HAP

slow

1000/1000

100.00%

100.00%

14

HAP

PLC Break

636/1000

100.00%

76.96%†

14a

HAP

Gum Break

1000/1000

100.00%

100.00%

†This percentage is revised to 98.98% after accounting for the 364 queries
not seen by the emulator.

by the arrow between packets. This example shows the difference in byte 0x2F, the TCP
Flags field. Value 0x10 in the Gumstix response indicates that the TCP Acknowledgment
(ACK) flag is set, while the PLC response shows value 0x18, indicating that the TCP ACK
and TCP Push (PSH) flags are both set. The presence of the PSH flag tells the receiver that
the sender has no more data to send right now, and that it can push what is in its receive
buffer to the application. This feature is not controllable in user-space, and its use varies in
TCP/IP stack implementations [Ste93]. Making these corrections with the kernel is a topic
for future work, described in Chapter 6.
Of the five byte differences between the emulator and the target PLC, the fifth different
byte is the 0x37th byte of response packet 6, which is the second byte of HTML data
payload in this packet. As seen in Figure 5.2, the emulator value is 0x3a, an ASCII colon
(’:’) character, and the PLC value is 0x0a, an ASCII line feed character. Because this
difference occurs with a whitespace character, it is likely due to a copy-and-paste situation
where a change to whitespace characters occurs when the byte that is pasted is not what is
copied. Another possibility is that a mistake was made when preparing the .html document
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Figure 5.1: Partial response packet number 4 for the Gumstix emulator and PLC. The solid
rectangles identify non-deterministic bytes identified in Appendix D. The arrow points to
the TCP Flags byte in both responses. This is a fingerprintable difference.

to be served by the Python webserver. Whatever the cause, this difference is easily fixed
once it has been discovered by changing the index.html document served by the Gumstix
emulator.

Figure 5.2: Incorrect HTML byte in emulator, likely due to copy and paste error during
implementation.
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The accuracy of the responses for the HAP standard requests is better than that of
web standard requests, seen in Table 5.1. This is because of the simplicity of UDP which
encapsulates the HAP protocol. There are a total of 309 bytes across one packet in a
HAP standard workload response. After excluding non-deterministic header fields defined
in Appendix E, 305 are deterministic, and exactly 305 are accurately emulated for each
query. Thus, the Gumstix emulator is 100% accurate for these types of queries. Again,
there are no confidence intervals because there is no variance among the trials conducted.
Also in Table 5.1 are results for the three request frequencies (detailed in Section
4.5.1.2) for both types of queries. Each scenario in Table 5.1 shows that the Gumstix has
no loss in packet-level accuracy as the frequencies are varied for either the web or HAP
standard workloads.
At the PLC Break request frequency level for both the web and HAP standard
workloads, only a fraction of the 1000 queries made to the Gumstix emulator are
successfully completed. Only the 319 and 636 respective completions are considered
in the percentage of packet bytes. Since the timing is the only parameter varied in this
scenario, these data suggests that the request frequency does not have an impact on packet
byte accuracy of the Gumstix emulator, since there is exactly zero difference in accuracy
between the different request frequencies for every successful trial.
5.2.2

Logging of Standard Workloads on the Gumstix Platform.

The percentage of packets logged is a derived metric based on the logging metric that
compares the number of packets sent to and received from the workload generator by the
emulator to the number of packets sent out-of-band to the logging server by the emulator.
The percentage of packets logged metric considers all the packets from all trials, and the
results of all 1000 trials for each timing level are pooled. Pooling is allowed because they
are all samples of same population, taken at different times.
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For 1000 successful standard web queries, 8,000 packets are sent to the emulator,
and 8,000 packets are received from it, for a total of 16,000 packets. The percentage
of logging packets sent to the logging server compared to the 16,000 total packets is the
percent packets of packets logged metric.
Table 5.1 shows that for every packet sent and received, 100% are logged for all
scenarios except the HAP workload at the PLC Break frequency, which is at 76.96%
packets logged. However, a closer look at this scenario shows a higher measure for the
percent of packets logged. Of the 1000 packets sent by the workload generator, only 636
are responded to by the emulator. After accounting for the 364 queries not seen (1000
queries – 636 responses), only 1272 packets should have been logged by the emulator
bringing the total percentage of packets logged to 98.98% as expressed by
1259
1259logged
=
= 98.98%packets logged
1636 − 364received by emulator 1272

(5.1)

Because all results are pooled it is difficult to conclude that, across all three request
frequencies the logging performance of the Gumstix emulator to standard web and HAP
workloads are statistically the same or different. While pooling makes it easier to determine
overall results, it prevents a confidence interval from being calculated since each log entry
is not tied directly to an individual query or response packet. However, the 100% success
rate for all web workload frequencies is strong evidence that no difference exists between
the Gumstix logging capability for these scenarios. The 1% difference among the standard
HAP logging percentages is also very favorable, and would likely have little to no impact
on real world applications of this emulator.
5.2.3

PC Packet Level Accuracy Results.

Table 5.2 shows the packet-level accuracy results the PC emulator platform. These
results are very similar to those for the Gumstix emulator platform presented in Section
5.2.1. The percentages of packet bytes correct are the same as the Gumstix. The differences
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between the PC emulator and target PLC byte values are exactly the same as the Gumstix
emulator, which is expected. The differences between the Gumstix and PC results are
reflected in the PLC Break request frequency scenarios, where the PC shows no degradation
in performance, in successful trials or packets logged.

Table 5.2: Packet level accuracy and logging results for the PC emulator.

Scenario Service

Request
Frequency

Successful
%packet
%packets
trials
bytes correct logged

1

Web

slow

1000/1000

99.79%

100.00%

2

Web

PLC Break

1000/1000

99.79%

100.00%

2a

Web

PC Break

1000/1000

99.79%

100.00%

5

HAP

slow

1000/1000

100.00%

100.00%

6

HAP

PLC Break

1000/1000

100.00%

100.00%

6a

HAP

PC Break

1000/1000

100.00%

100.00%

Despite the different Linux platforms and therefore the likely different implementations of Linux kernel TCP/IP stacks, the same differences in the deterministic fields as
compared to the target PLC platform occur in the PC as they do in the Gumstix platform.
The result is identical values for the percentages of packet bytes correct metrics for both
the standard web and standard HAP workloads.
The different request frequencies seem to have no effect on the accuracy of the PC
emulator, with both web and HAP percentages of bytes correct metrics consistent across
all three request frequency levels at 99.79% and 100% for the standard web and HAP
workloads, respectively.
5.2.4

Logging of Standard Workloads on the PC Platform.

The logging performance of the PC platform as measured by the percentage of packets
logged metric shows that the PC logs all packets successfully. The ability of the PC to log
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standard workloads is only different under the PLC break conditions when compared to the
Gumstix platform. Though pooling of the trials prevents a statistical analysis, the results
suggest that the logging capability between the Gumstix and PC platforms for standard web
and HAP workloads is equivalent.
Despite the fact that the accuracy rate of 99.7% is less than 100% for the web standard
workload, it is concluded that these results are suitable for cyber sensor and honeypot
applications because attackers are not actively looking for ICS honeypots because there are
very few known implementations, and none using this target PLC.
5.3

Scanning Level Accuracy
5.3.1

Gumstix Scanning-Level Accuracy Results.

The percentage of Nmap Fields correct is a derived metric based on the Nmap OS
Fingerprinting Fields metric, similar to the percentage of bytes correct metric. Instead of
comparing bytes, the percentage of Nmap Fields correct metric compares the results of the
emulator Nmap fields metric to the baseline Nmap fields metric for the target PLC.
There are 113 unique fields across four sections. Like the packet bytes metric, there
are non-deterministic fields. These fields vary across repeated scans of the target PLC.
The non-deterministic fields unique to Nmap for OS detection scans include the Sequence
Prediction Index (SP) (also reported as the TCP sequence prediction), TCP Initial Sequence
Number Counter Rate (ISR), and Unused ICMP port unreachable field nonzero (UN) fields.
A screenshot of the non-deterministic fields and their values is seen in Figure 5.3. The SP
and ISR fields report statistical data of the TCP initial sequence numbers (ISN) of response
packets returned by the scanned device. The TCP ISN is intended to be pseudorandom
(i.e., non-deterministic) to protect against TCP hijacking and other attacks.
The scope of this research is to accurately reproduce the most important, deterministic
fields, which excluded accurate reproduction of the target PLC’s sequence number
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Figure 5.3: Comparison between the results of the Nmap Scans of the Gumstix emulator
and the target PLC with the non-deterministic fields highlighted.

generation algorithm. Relative to the other purely deterministic fields, these three Nmap
fields are much harder to fingerprint because a statistical analysis must be done to determine
differences between the emulator and target PLC. The design of the emulator uses recycled
ISNs from hard-coded configurations in the infilter.o executable, and further investigation
of comparison of emulator to target PLC sequence number generation is left for future
work. Because no effort has been done to disprove that the ISN numbers are statistically
different, and because this is an acknowledged difference between the Gumstix (and PC)
emulation and the target PLC, these three fields are classified as important, and incorrect
matches in these fields count against the accuracy.
The UN field represents data that is incorrectly placed in the last four bytes of the
ICMP header, in contradiction to ICMP request for comments (RFC) 792 [Lyo09, Pos81].
When these bytes are set, Nmap places their value in the UN in the OS Scan details section.
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This field also seems random based on the observed responses from the target PLC, but
without statistical proof that Gumstix (and PC) emulation of the UN field is the same as the
target PLC, incorrect matches in this field count against the accuracy. Thus, the emulator is
97.25% accurate (106 correct out of 109 deterministic fields) at the scanning-level overall
when accounting for deterministic fields.
Table 5.3 shows that scanning-level accuracy of the Gumstix emulator platform as
measured by the percentage of Nmap Fields correct metric is 97.25% at both slow and fast
request frequency levels. The slow and fast frequency levels are defined in Section 4.3.

Table 5.3: Scanning-level accuracy and logging results for the Gumstix emulator. The
percentages include include the non-determinisic fields.

Scenario

Request Successful
%Nmap
Frequency
trials
fields correct

%packets
logged

11

slow

5/5

97.25%

95.64%

12

fast

5/5

97.25%

98.75%

Despite the fact that the Gumstix emulation differs by 3 fields, the results are still
excellent, and the chances of the emulator being fingerprinted by the Nmap OS fields are
small. This is primarily due to the fact that the vast majority of fields are consistent with
the device, and if a public fingerprint of the device was available in the Nmap OS database,
there is a very high probability that the emulator would match that fingerprint. Additionally,
to fingerprint the device based on these erroneous fields, a user would have to know the
underlying distribution of the sequence numbers for the target device a priori, which is not
likely. The user then must accurately measure the distribution of the emulator’s sequence
numbers, also not likely.
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The accuracy rate among all deterministic fields is 97.25%. It is concluded that the
results for scanning-level accuracy are suitable for the emulator’s application in SCADA
attack-landscape research as a honeypot based on this analysis.
The results for both slow and fast request frequencies shown in Table 5.3 indicate that
the Gumstix has no change in accuracy as the request frequencies are varied. Because this
is the only parameter varied in this scenario, and the number of trials conducted, the data
suggests that the request frequency does not have an impact on Nmap field accuracy of the
Gumstix emulator.
5.3.2

Logging Results of Non-Standard Workloads on the Gumstix Platform .

To determine the ability of the Gumstix emulator to log non-standard workloads, the
percentage of packets logged metric is again used. Table 5.3 shows 95.64% success for
all packets for the five trials at the slow request frequency and 98.75% success for the five
trials at the high frequency. The results of all five trials for each timing level are pooled,
generating over 1.3 million packets for each timing level. They can be pooled because they
are all samples of same population, taken at different times.
It is difficult to do the same type of analysis performed with Equation 5.1 because of
the complexity of Nmap probes. The calculation performed in Equation 5.1 depends on the
fact 636 packets are known to have been received by the emulator because responses for
636 queries were sent. With Nmap scans, there is no easy way of knowing which probe
packets are received by the emulator, because some Nmap probe packets illicit no response
(i.e., an open UDP port sends no response when probed).
A comparison in Figure 5.4 of the percentages of packets logged at the different
request frequency timing levels shows that the Gumstix logs a higher percentage of packets
when scanned at the faster, more efficient (T5) timing profile, compared to being scanned
at the slower, less efficient, default (T3) timing profile, and it is concluded that request
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frequency does have an affect on the Gumstix ability to log non-standard web workload
(Nmap scan).
This is an interesting and counterintuitive observation which may be due to a number
of confounding factors related to the complexity of Nmap OS scans. These T5 timing
profile configuration features include differences in handling of parallelization, probe
retries, and timeouts designed to make the T5 profile (also known as the "insane" timing
profile) faster and more efficient. It is evident by Figure 5.4 that in this scenario, these
efficiencies enable better performance for the Gumstix emulator for the T5 timing profile.
As a result, fewer probes are actually sent to the emulator, which means fewer packets
needed to be logged. For example, the five trials for the T3 timing profile generates
1,377,140 packets (logging 95.64% according to Table 5.3), while the T5 timing profile
generates only 1,330,925 packets (logging 98.75% according to Table 5.3).
5.3.3

PC Scanning-Level Accuracy Results.

Table 5.4 shows the scanning-level accuracy results for the PC emulator platform.
These results are similar to those for the Gumstix emulator platform presented in Section
5.3.
Similar to the Gumstix, the different request frequencies have no affect on the
scanning-level accuracy of the PC emulator, with the percentage of correct Nmap fields
consistent across both request frequency levels, both at 97.25%. These values are the same
as the Gumstix because the differences between the PC emulator and target PLC Nmap
fields are exactly the same as the Gumstix emulator, as expected. Figure 5.5 shows that
there is no apparent difference in the percentages of packets logged for the PC emulator
between the fast and slow web non-standard workload frequencies, however every packet
is not logged in either scenario.
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Figure 5.4: Comparison of percentage of packets logged by the Gumstix emulator at
different request frequency levels showing 99% CI for the mean.

Table 5.4: Scanning-level accuracy and logging results for the PC emulator.
percentages include include the non-determinisic fields.

Scenario

Request Successful
%Nmap
Frequency
trials
fields correct

%packets
logged

3

slow

5/5

97.25%

99.97%

4

PLC Break

5/5

97.25%

100.00%
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The

Figure 5.5: Comparison of percentage of packets logged by the PC emulator at different
request frequency levels showing 99% CI for the mean.

With such high numbers of packets, it is difficult to assess exactly why packets at
respective timing levels for both the Gumstix and PC did not get logged. Because the
number of packets needing to be logged is so high (around 270,000 for each scan), it is
likely that when the send buffer on the LAN-facing interface of the Gumstix becomes full,
queued packets are simply dumped.
Is it also a possibility that, like experimental scenario 14 described in Section 5.2.1, a
number of packets are never seen by the emulator, and therefore are not logged. However,
due to the large number of packets, the same type of analysis performed in Section 5.2.1
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Figure 5.6: Comparison between Gumstix and PC logging functionality for web nonstandard workload at both request frequencies.

is not possible. Figure 5.6 shows the results of a comparison of all percentages of packets
logged. No statistical difference between the Gumstix and PC ability to log Nmap scan
workloads at the T5 request frequency is evident. However the PC’s logging capability
is significantly better (at a 99% CI) for the T3 Nmap scan workload compared to the
Gumstix’s logging ability at the same level. The higher percentage of packets logged of
the T5 workload versus the T3 workload for the Gumstix are explained in Section 5.3.2.
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5.4

Attack Level Accuracy
The successful unlocks metric measures if the Metasploit exploit successfully

unlocked the CUT. The results for the baseline target PLC in Table 5.5 show all attacks are
successful at unlocking the target PLC for both the slow and PLC Break request frequency
levels. Thus, the baseline for the emulators is that all 5 trials at the prescribed request
frequencies complete successfully.

Table 5.5: Attack results for the target PLC.

Scenario

Request
Frequency

Workload
Input value

Trials

successful
unlocks

%packets
logged

23

slow

1

5

5

100.00%

24

PLC Break

3.2555

5

5

100.00%

5.4.1

Gumstix Attack-Level Accuracy Results.

The results for attack-level accuracy as measured by the successful unlocks metric
of the Gumstix and percentage of packets logged are shown in Table 5.6. All attacks are
successful at all timing levels.

Table 5.6: Attack-level accuracy and logging results for the Gumstix emulator.

Scenario

Request
Frequency

Workload
Input value

Trials

successful
unlocks

%packets
logged

15

slow

0.081

5

5

100.00%

16

PLC Break

0.266

5

5

100.00%

16a

Gum Break

480

5

5

100.00%
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5.4.2

PC Attack Level Accuracy Results.

The results for attack-level accuracy as measured by the successful unlocks metric of
the PC and percentage of packets logged are shown in Table 5.7. All attacks are successful
at all timing levels.

Table 5.7: Attack-level accuracy and logging results for the PC emulator.

Scenario

Request
Frequency

Workload
Input value

Trials

successful
unlocks

%packets
logged

7

slow

0.071

5

5

100.00%

8

PLC Break

0.2304

5

5

100.00%

8a

PC Break

3000

5

5

100.00%

It is concluded that the Gumstix and PC are both 100% accurate for all request
frequency levels for attack-level accuracy. Request frequency also appears to have no effect
on logging for either the Gumstix or PC since 100% of packets are logged under all request
frequency levels.
5.5

Timing Level Accuracy
The Deviation from the Baseline is a derived metric based on the Response Time metric

used to compare the results for the emulator responses to the baseline target PLC responses.
The data shown are from the scenarios already presented, but are discussed separately
because they represent a different level of accuracy.
The emulator results are compared to the baseline two different ways, additive and
multiplicative. Both values are shown to allow for intuitive interpretation of the results.
Negative signs in Table 5.8 through Table 5.14 indicate that the mean response time for
emulator responses is longer than the baseline (target PLC) mean response time.
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5.5.1

Gumstix Timing Level Accuracy Results for Standard Workloads.

The timing results for the web and HAP standard workloads are shown in Table 5.8.
Only successful trials are considered when calculating the mean. For all scenarios, the
Gumstix responded slower than the target PLC. The most notable differences occur at the
PLC Break request frequency levels for both the web and HAP standard workloads. The
purpose of this experimental scenario is to determine how the Gumstix emulator performs
at the maximum capability of the target PLC.

Table 5.8: Timing accuracy results for Gumstix emulator for the web and HAP standard
workloads.
Response
(s)

PLC
Baseline
(s)

Deviation from
baseline

Scenario

Request Success
Frequency
Trials

Service

9

Web

slow

1000

0.0842 3.70e-3

0.0376

-0.046s

2.2 × Slower

10

Web

PLC Break

319

2.3503

0.093

-2.256s

25 × Slower

10a

Web

Gum Break

1000

0.1831 3.16e-2

-2.439s

1.9 × Slower

13

HAP

slow

1000

0.0034 4.39e-4

0.0026

-0.0007s 1.3 × Slower

14

HAP

PLC Break

636

0.2003 1.74e-4

0.0020

-0.193s 98.6 × Slower

14a

HAP

Gum Break

1000

0.1522 1.40e-1

Mean

S.D.

6.44

-0.350s 74.9 × Slower

The results show the Gumstix emulator is up to 25 and 98.6 times slower in response
to web and HAP respectively compared to the PLC. Figure 5.7 plots the 319 successful web
standard requests by their response time. The dashed lines on the graph represent 1, 2, 4,
and 8 standard deviations in response times above the mean. The distribution of response
times shows that the majority of queries are completed with a response time around 0.678s.
There are only 47 of 319 observations above the mean return time of 2.3503s, meaning that
the results are drastically skewed due to the very high relative response times of only a few
data points.
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Additional investigation into these extreme data points reveals that they are valid and
represent actual response times. The cause is long TCP timeout values that go into effect
after the TCP three-way handshake has been completed. Figure 5.8 shows the capture of
the TCP stream for the connection that is over eight standard deviations from the mean in
Figure 5.7. The stream shows that after the initial handshake, the GET request times out
three times before the emulator finally responds. Because the TCP retransmission delay
doubles with each timeout, the workload generator waits 45.123s before getting an ACK
from the emulator. Therefore, it is concluded that because these extreme response times
represent valid functionality of TCP, the data points are valid, and must be considered in
the analysis.

Another interesting result of the scenarios in Table 5.8 is that the mean response times
for the data at the device’s respective break request frequency (PLC Break or Gumstix
Break) are longer than those of the respective slow request frequencies. The target PLC is
slower to respond, on average, to consecutive requests at its maximum request frequency
when compared to the target PLC’s response times for the slow request frequency. The
same observation is true for the Gumstix. This implies that as the request frequency
increases to and beyond the device’s maximum response rate, the trials are no longer
independent. That is, the trials begin to interact with each other, which is not the original
intention of this experimental scenario. To verify this phenomenon, Figure 5.9 shows a plot
of response times in the order that they are observed. The Gumstix and the target PLC are
shown both at the PLC break request frequency level. The upper graph shows the response
time for the Gumstix linearly increasing to a plateau at 0.678s, and the lower graph shows
the response times of the target PLC gradually increasing, then gradually decreasing over
1000 trials. On both graphs the mean and delay between queries are shown by dashed
lines. In both cases, the delay between queries is just below the very first response from the
device, indicating that queries are arriving at the devices faster than they can respond. The
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Figure 5.7: Response times for the Gumstix emulator at the PLC break frequency showing
the data points that are 1, 2, 4, and 8 standard deviations from the mean.

result is a steady increase in response times. While the Gumstix plateaus, the target PLC
exhibits a cyclic pattern. These phenomena are likely due to the handling of the send and
receive buffers on the respective devices.
Figure 5.10 shows the results of the three request frequency levels for the Gumstix at
99% CI for the mean for the web standard workload. The graph shows there is a statistical
difference between the means of all three response speeds for the three different request
frequency levels. Therefore, it is concluded that request frequency does affect the timing
accuracy of the Gumstix emulator for the web standard workload.
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Figure 5.8: TCP connection with anomalous response time 8 SD above the mean.
Highlights show workload generator repeatedly trying to sent the GET request and timing
out.

The Gumstix timing accuracy results for the HAP standard workload are also in Table
5.8 and follow a similar pattern as the web mean response times: all mean response times
for the Gumstix are slower than the target PLC.
Observing the results of the response times for Gumstix at the PLC Break request
frequency level, another interesting trend is apparent in Figure 5.11. Drastic jumps in
response time of around one-quarter second each are seen. The dashed lines represent
where all but 3 of the 364 dropped queries for this workload occurred. Again, this repetitive
behavior at the Gumstix boundary conditions is likely due to receiving buffer limitations.
As the receive buffer gradually becomes full, response times lengthen as queries spend
more time waiting in the input buffer. When the receive buffer is full, additional incoming
queries are dropped. It is possible that quarter-second increases occur when the receive
buffer is being processed, or possibly when the log packets are sent from the second LANfacing interface, but it is impossible to tell exactly what causes these regular jump without
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Figure 5.9: Response times plotted against observation number for web Standard workload
at PLC break frequency. These graphs demonstrate that as the request frequencies approach
(lower graph) or exceed (upper graph) their fastest response time, trials are no longer
independent. Not all observations are shown for the Gumstix responses.
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Figure 5.10: Results comparing all three request frequency levels of the Gumstix for the
web standard workload.

diving deep into the Gumstix Ethernet hardware and Linux drivers, which is beyond scope
of this research.
Because neither PC or PLC platforms exhibit this behavior at this request frequency
for the HAP standard workload (graphs available in Appendix H), the response time
measurement may be a way to fingerprint the Gumstix hardware, independently of the
emulator application. Further investigation of fingerprinting of the Gumstix hardware via
timing is beyond scope of this research, and is left for future work.
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Figure 5.11: Non-continuous jumps in response time of a quarter second (nominal) for the
Gumstix. The dashed lines represent where most of the queries are dropped.

The results for the HAP standard workload on the Gumstix also show there is a
statistical difference between the means of all three response speeds for the three different
request frequency levels at the 99% CI. The plot of this data is similar to Figure 5.10 and
can be found in Appendix H. Therefore it is concluded that request frequency does affect
the timing accuracy of the Gumstix emulator.
5.5.2

PC Timing Accuracy Results for Standard Workloads.

Results for the PC timing-level accuracy for standard workloads are shown in Table
5.9. All mean response times are faster for the PC as compared to the mean response times
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for the target PLC. The results show that, compared to the baseline for the web standard
workload, the PC is 13.4 times faster at responding to the slow request frequency workload,
and 38.4 times faster at responding to the maximum target PLC request, when compared
to the target PLC. The PC is 6.8 and 5.6 times faster at responding to the HAP standard
workloads when compared to the target PLC for the respective request frequency levels.
An analysis similar to the Gumstix is performed to determine if the means of the
results at different request frequency levels are statistically different. For the web standard
workload on the PC, there is no statistical difference between the slow and PLC Break
request frequencies, but there is a difference from these two levels to PC Break request
frequency, all at the 99% CI for the mean. For the HAP standard workload on the PC, all
three means show a statistical difference at the 99% CI. The resulting graphs can be found
in Appendix H. Therefore, it is concluded that request frequency does have a significant
effect on PC response times for web and HAP standard workloads.

Scenario

Table 5.9: Timing Accuracy results for PC emulator for the web and HAP standard
workloads.
Request Success
Service
Frequency
Trials

Response
(s)
Mean

PLC
Baseline
(s)

Deviation from
baseline

S.D.

1

Web

slow

1000

0.002817 6.26e-4 0.037685

0.0349

13.4 × Faster

2

Web

PLC Break

1000

0.002449 6.58e-4

0.0915

38.4 × Faster

2a

Web

PC Break

1000

0.003034 6.11e-4

0.0885

39.6 × Faster

5

HAP

slow

1000

0.000397 2.04e-4 0.002699

0.0023

6.8 × Faster

6

HAP

PLC Break

1000

0.000362 4.55e-5 0.002032

0.0017

5.6 × Faster

6a

HAP

PC Break

1000

0.000309 4.56e-5

0.0014

6.6 × Faster
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0.09395

Table 5.11 compares mean response times of the Gumstix and PC for all web and HAP
standard workload scenarios. The data show that the PC has a faster mean response time
for all scenarios.
A comparison between all three devices and their mean response times for the web
standard workload is shown in Figure 5.12 with the 99% confidence intervals for the mean.
Two groups for the standard and PLC Break request frequency levels are shown.
To aid visual comparison, two scales are also shown, one for the Gumstix at PLC
Break request frequency level scenario, and one for the other five scenarios. The confidence
levels for five of the plots are not visible with the shown scale which is accounted for by
the high number of samples taken and the low variability of the samples.
The Gumstix at PLC Break request frequency level shown in Figure 5.12 does have
a visible confidence level (note the scale). The results show that there is a statistically
significant differences between all three devices at both the slow (std) and PLC Break
request frequency levels.
To verify these results, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) test is conducted for all
three devices, grouped by request frequency level. The results are shown in Table 5.10
with resulting p-values of 2.2e-16. The p-value here is the probability of seeing results at
least as extreme as these assuming that the three means are equal. The ANOVA confirms
that the three means are different. Therefore, it is concluded that for the standard web
workload, the PC has significantly faster return times compared to the Gumstix.

Table 5.10: Results of ANOVA test conducted on web standard workload for all three
devices.
Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F Value Pr(>F)
Factor(levels)
Residuals

2

4.0875

2.0437

2997 0.0141

0.0000

113

45301 <2.2e-16

Request
Frequency

Gumstix

Deviation

PC

Response Time
(s)
Mean

S.D.

Scenario

Scenario

Service

Table 5.11: Comparison between Gumstix and PC emulator for timing accuracy results.

Response Time
(s)
Mean

(s)

Times

S.D.

Web

slow

9

0.0842

8.42e-02

Web

PLC Break

10

2.3503

2.35e+00 2 0.002449 6.58e-4

-2.3478s 959.7 ×

Web Device Break 10a 0.1831

1.83e-01 2a 0.003034 6.11e-4

-0.1800s

60.3 ×

HAP

slow

13

0.0034

3.40e-03

5 0.000397 2.04e-4

-0.0030s

8.6 ×

HAP

PLC Break

14

0.2003

2.00e-01

6 0.000362 4.55e-5

-0.1999s 553.3 ×

1.52e-01 6a 0.000309 4.56e-5

-0.1518s 492.6 ×

HAP Device Break 14a 0.1522

1 0.002817 6.26e-4

-0.0813s

29.9 ×

A similar analysis is performed for the HAP standard workload. The shapes of the
graph is almost identical to the results in Figure 5.9. The results of the ANOVA done
on these scenarios are shown in Table 5.12. These values are extremely low (2.2e-16) and
confirm that none of the three means are the same. This graph can be found in Appendix H.
The conclusion is also that the PC response times are significantly faster than the Gumstix
for the HAP standard workload.

Table 5.12: Results of ANOVA test conducted on HAP standard workload for all three
devices.
Df
Factor(levels)
Residuals

5.5.3

2

Sum Sq

Mean Sq

F Value Pr(>F)

0.0049516 0.00247579 31126 <2.2e-16

2317 0.0002384 0.00000008

Timing Accuracy Results for Web Non-Standard Workloads .

The results for the mean completion times for the Nmap scans (web non-standard
workload) for all three devices are shown in Table 5.13. Like the previous results for the
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Figure 5.12: Mean response times for Gumstix, PC, and PLC for the web standard
workload (Standard and PLC Break request frequencies).

standard workloads, the mean response time for the Gumstix is slower than that of the
target PLC by multiples of 4.36 and 2.59 relative to the request frequency levels. The PC
performs faster than the target by 1.48 and 1.55 times, respectively. When compared to
the PC, the Gumstix performs 16.43 times slower for the slow request frequency level and
10.13 times slower for the PLC Break request frequency level. Figure 5.13 confirms that
there is a significant difference between all three devices for their respective response times
with 99% CI for the mean. While there is no significant difference between the fast (T5)
and slow (T3) frequency request levels for either the PC or target PLC, there is a statistically
significant difference between the two levels for the Gumstix. The results show that the PC
response time is significantly faster than the target PLC to the web non-standard workload,
and the Gumstix is significantly slower.
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Table 5.13: Timing Accuracy results for Gumstix and PC emulators for the Web NonStandard (Nmap) Workload.

Request
Scenario Device
Frequency
11

Gumstix

12

Gumstix PLC Break

slow

Average
Completion
time (s)

PLC
deviation from baseline
Baseline

693.068

129.376s 563.6920 4.36 × Slower

385.942

107.464s 278.4780 2.59 × Slower

3

PC

slow

42.19

129.376s -87.1860

1.48 × Faster

4

PC

PLC Break

37.992

107.464s -69.4720

1.55 × Faster

Figure 5.13: Mean response times for the Nmap scan for all devices at the Fast (T5) and
Slow (T3) request frequencies.
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5.5.4

Timing Accuracy Results for HAP Non-Standard Workloads .

The results for the mean completion times for the Metasploit attack (HAP nonstandard workload) for all three devices are shown in Table 5.14. During pilot studies
to determine request frequency levels, the Metasploit workload frequency is artificially
increased using tcpreplay to create multiple request frequency levels. The PLC break
request frequency level is determined by recording the final request frequency at which
the Metasploit exploit would no longer work on the target PLC.

Table 5.14: Timing accuracy results for the Gumstix and PC for the HAP non-standard
(Metasploit) workload.

Scenario Query
15

Gumstix

16

Mean
Request
Response Time
Frequency
(s)

PLC
Baseline

deviation from baseline

0.009335

0.014877

-0.0055

1.59 × faster

Gumstix PLC Break

0.0086

0.016386

-0.0078

1.91 × faster

16a

Gumstix

PC Break

0.38192

7

PC

slow

0.000927

0.014877

-0.0140

16.05 × faster

8

PC

PLC Break

0.000571

0.016386

-0.0158

28.70 × faster

8a

PC

PC Break

0.01428

slow

Figure 5.14 shows a graphical comparison of all three devices at the PLC break and
slow (std) request frequency levels. Both the Gumstix and PC emulators mean response
times are faster than the mean response time of the target PLC. Figure 5.14 also shows that
the request frequency does not have a statistically significant effect on the target PLC, but
it does have a significant effect on the response times of the Gumstix and the PC.
Figure 5.15 and Figure 5.16 respectively show the results for the mean response times
for both PC and the Gumstix emulators at all three tested request frequency levels. The
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Figure 5.14: Results for Metasploit scenarios comparing mean response time of all three
devices.

results show a very small statistical significance differential in the means for both emulators
at the 99% CI. At the 99% CI, values are extremely close, with a difference on the order of
10-4 . To provide clear analysis, the decision to drop the level from 99% CI is made because
95% CI is still acceptable.
Figure 5.16 shows two graphs of the same data, but at different scales. The lower
graph is provided because it is unclear in the upper graph if the CIs of the means overlap or
not. Based on these results, it is concluded that request frequency does have a significant
effect on the mean response times for both the PC and Gumstix emulators for the HAP
non-standard workload.
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Figure 5.15: Mean response times for the PC for the HAP non-standard (Metasploit)
workload at all three request frequency levels.

5.6

Summary
This chapter presents the results and analysis for the scenarios conducted on the

emulator at different request frequencies for four different workload types. Results and
analysis includes metrics for packet bytes, Nmap fields, successful Metasploit execution,
and response time. Finally, logging results and analysis are also presented.
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Figure 5.16: Mean response times for the Gumstix for the HAP non-standard (Metasploit)
workload at all three request frequency levels.
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VI.

6.1

Conclusions

Introduction
This chapter summarizes the overall conclusions of the research. Section 6.2 presents

conclusions based on the results and analysis from Chapter 5. Section 6.3 discusses the
significance of this research. Section 6.4 discusses recommendations and approaches for
future research.
6.2

Research Conclusions
6.2.1

Accuracy of Standard Queries at the Packet Level.

At the packet level, the Gumstix and PC are both very accurate with both achieving
99.79% and 100% bytes of accuracy for the standard web and HAP workloads, respectively.
For packet-level accuracy, confidence intervals are zero due to no variance among the
trials conducted. Therefore, the performance of both platforms is equivalent with regard
to packet-level accuracy. Accuracies less than 100% that are consistent and predictable
enable fingerprinting of the emulated device. These rates however, are not expected to
affect SCADA landscape research applications. The number of ICS honeypots accessible
on the Internet is likely very few, and therefore there is no reason that an attacker would
suspect an emulator to be anything but authentic. These results are detailed in Section 5.2.
6.2.2

Accuracy at the Scanning and Attack Levels .

At the scanning-level, both the Gumstix and PC platforms are equivalently accurate
with each of them being 97.25% accurate at all request frequency levels. The fields that
are not accurate are associated with the difference between the emulator’s and target PLC’s
initial sequence number generator algorithm. To fingerprint the emulator based on these
erroneous fields, significant additional information and analysis is needed. Considering the
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fact that the purpose of tools like Nmap is to make such analysis unnecessary, it is not likely
any user would second guess the Nmap results, and conduct such analysis.
At the attack-level, both platforms performed perfectly in all request scenarios, with
each tested scenario resulting in 100% of attacks executed being successful. These results
lead to the conclusion that the scanning-level and attack-level accuracies of both emulator
platforms are adequate for all applications, including as a SCADA landscape research tool.
These results are detailed in Sections 5.3 and 5.4.
6.2.3

Accuracy at the Timing Levels .

There are significant departures from the baseline timing measurements taken for both
emulator platforms. For nearly all of the standard and non-standard scenarios, the Gumstix
platform underperformed the target PLC with regard to mean response times, being as
much as 98.6 times slower for some workloads when compared to the target PLC. The PC
emulator platform however, over-performed the target PLC for all scenarios with regard
to mean response times, being as much as 959.7 times faster for some workloads when
compared to the target PLC. While it is trivial to increase the delay of the PC to more
closely match the timing profile of target PLC, it is more difficult decrease the delay of the
Gumstix.
A qualitative assessment of the emulator is based on scenarios that are likely to occur
during standard use as an emulated honeypot. At request frequencies that would be typical
in an actual attack (slow request frequencies), the Gumstix timing performance for the Web
standard and HAP standard workloads are only 0.046s and 0.0007s slower when compared
to the target PLC. An increase of 0.046s is very unlikely to be noticed by a user interacting
with the emulator across the Internet, even if the emulator is implemented on the same
node as an actual PLC. Therefore, both device platforms are suitable as honeypot emulators
based on to timing performance to perform attack landscape research.
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For applications that require a high level of timing accuracy, such as laboratory
research, the PC platform is preferred over the Gumstix platform. With enhancements
and optimizations for speed, it is speculated that the Gumstix platform could be brought
within the timing range of the target PLC. These results are detailed in Section 5.5.
6.2.4

Logging Performance .

Both platforms did exceptionally well logging all incoming and outgoing packets,
with a success rate of 97.21% for the Gumstix and 99.99% for the PC. The most significant
deficiencies of logging packets for both platforms occurred during the web non-standard
(Nmap scan) workloads. However, because there are other methods to log (as opposed to
logging every single packet), and it is not practical to log Nmap scans anyway (the size of
the logs reaches 34 MB for a single OS scan), these results could be even better.
Based on the ability of both emulators to successfully log over 97% at such high data
throughputs, it is likely that a subset of all incoming and outgoing packets will be logged at
the same or better rates since logging every packet of an Nmap OS Fingerprint scan is not
desired or practical. A better approach for these scans is to identify an active scan, and log
vital packets only. This is much more desirable, and is left for future work. Therefore, it is
concluded that the logging performance of both emulator platforms is considered adequate
for all applications. These results are detailed in Sections 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4.
6.2.5

Performance Effects of Request Frequency.

The effects of varying the request frequency during test scenarios differ among the
various workloads. While the PC is able to perform with no significant loss of accuracy or
logging performance at the PLC Break request frequency level in all scenarios, the Gumstix
does suffer loss in both accuracy and performance. These results are likely linked with
the Timing Accuracy results, and are only solved by decreasing the response time of the
Gumstix emulator. As the request frequency approaches the Gumstix’s fastest response
rate, the response time increases and some queries stop receiving replies. It is likely the

123

Gumstix’s receive buffer is being filled faster than it can process the responses until it
reaches a plateau at which point queries start begin dropped, and the Gumstix is never
able to recover. It may be possible to increase the receive buffer of the Gumstix to reduce
dropped packets, but the response times will grow significantly based on the results in
Section 5.5.1. The only viable solution is to increase the Gumstix’s top response speed,
which also increases the emulator’s timing accuracy.
The PLC break request frequency level is specifically designed to test the emulators
at the target PLC’s maximum limits. These rates are not indicative of standard or even
common conditions a real PLC would ever see in operation unless it is under a DoS or
other attack, or being fingerprinted. At standard request frequencies, Gumstix response
times could easily be due to link delay, as opposed to device delay. These results are
detailed in Chapter 5.
6.2.6

Impact of the Gumstix Platform.

The results show that there is an impact to timing accuracy when the emulator operates
on the Gumstix platform, and a marginal impact to logging capability. It is speculated
that there are very few SCADA honeypots currently on the Internet. Therefore it is not
likely that the minor timing differences between the target PLC and the Gumstix honeypot
emulator would be attributed to anything besides latency. In other applications that warrant
precise timing accuracy, a PC could be used to perform the emulation. These results are
detailed in Chapter 5.
6.2.7

Final Assessment.

Based on the results, extensive knowledge of the specific implementations of the
protocols or timing profiles of the target PLC are required to identify and fingerprint the
Gumstix device as a honeypot. Furthermore, there are very few actively maintined SCADA
honeypot systems available and it is speculated that SCADA honeypots are not actively
being looked for by attackers. These facts coupled with the experimental data suggest that
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a honeypot implemented on a Gumstix emulator is suitable for applications in SCADA
attack-landscape research. Further research should be conducted to increase the timing
performance of the emulator before being deployed in applications that are sensitve to
emulation timing discrepancies, such as SCADA laboratory research. In these types of
applications, the PC platform should be used.
6.3

Significance of Research
It has been shown that there are thousands of industrial control devices, including field

level devices such as PLCs exposed on the Internet, but the extent that these devices are
being exploited is still largely unknown. Furthermore, costs of even a modest industrial
control systems comprised of several devices escalates very quickly, making research,
education, and training of ICS attacks and protection methods significant investment.
The accuracy and logging performance of the PLC emulator implemented on the
Gumstix single-board computer for this effort are quantified and compared against the
emulator implemented on a standard PC and the actual PLC that the emulation seeks
to imitate. The research suggests that the Gumstix platform provides highly accurate
responses in all categories except response timing.
Therefore, the Gumstix and PC platforms are adequate for applications such
as SCADA attack-landscape research and cyber sensing, two functions that can be
implemented with SCADA honeypots. Even if the device is fingerprinted as a honeypot,
valuable data will be gathered from the attack that will provide information on how to
better hide honeypots in the future. For other applications that require a high degree of
timing accuracy, such as SCADA laboratory research, it is suggested that the PC be used
as the emulation platform.
Further development of the Gumstix emulator device is suggested to optimize timing
performance. With these enhancements to the emulation software, the Gumstix platform

125

emulator device is speculated to show significant timing improvements, enabling use of the
Gumstix platform for all emulation applications including laboratory research.
6.4

Future Work
This section discusses various avenues for future research. Sections 6.4.1 through

6.4.7 discuss enhancements to this implementation of of a SCADA/ICS field device
emulator honeypot or design ideas that should be considered in the implementation of
a new implementation.

Sections 6.4.8 through 6.4.10 discuss other areas and ideas

related to SCADA/ICS field device emulators and honeypots, but not necessarily this
implementation.
6.4.1

Enhance Timing Accuracy of Gumstix Emulator.

In the current implementation, timing for the Gumstix Emulator is significantly slower
than the target PLC. It is speculated that a significant amount of time is wasted when
packets are pulled out of the Linux kernel into the user-space queuing programs though
the iptables functionality.

Preliminary results suggest that there are big gains to be

made if avoiding the use of NFQUEUE targets is possible. The means eliminating the
logging queue (logging.o), input filter queue (infilter.o), and output filter queue (outfilter.o).
Elimination of the logging queue is discussed in the Section 6.4.2, and elimination of the
filter queues is possible with the implementation of a user-space TCP/IP stack, discussed
in Section 6.4.3.
6.4.2

Timing Improvements through Efficient Logging.

In the current implementation, every packet that goes into or out of the emulator is
sent to the Syslog server. There are many thousands of packets that are sent to and from
the emulator during routine use, and as the results in Chapter 5 show, some packet loss
occurs during high packet workloads such as Nmap OS fingerprint scans. Furthermore, a
log file exceeds 30MB for a single scan. Not every packet from an OS scan has useful
information, but some might. Rather than recording every packet, a better approach would
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be to log only packets that are interesting. The C Syslog API that is currently used in
logging.o makes it trivial to send log entries from any C program, and a similar API exists
for Python. Therefore, it may be a better approach to selectively submit log entries based
on the logic within the processes. There is a potential double-impact to response times (1)
not all packets are logged, therefore processing time is diverted from the main processes to
send logs, and (2) every packet does not need to come out of the kernel to be logged. These
efficiencies could help increase the timing-level accuracy of the Gumstix in its current form.
There is a different approach to log every packet, if that functionality is desired. The
current logging mechanism uses an NFQUEUE target to pull every single packet from the
kernel into user-space to process, then sends it back into the kernel. This is very inefficient.
A different, better approach would be to use the Libpcap C API to sniff the wire and log
every packet. Every packet is still pulled out of the kernel, but it is never re-injected back
into the kernel, potentially saving time.
6.4.3

Enhance the Nmap Scan Handler.

Currently, the device is limited to handling default configurations of Nmap OS scans.
By adding additional logic to the infilter.o process, any number of configurations should
be able to be handled by the emulator to successfully fool Nmap. For example, probes are
sent to the first non-open port found by Nmap, which by default, is TCP port 1. Portions of
the emulator scanner may fail if the default configuration of Nmap is modified, degrading
scanning-level accuracy. Cases inside of infilter.o can be created to handle such non-default
situations.
As an alternative to modifying the infilter.o process, the Honeyd emulator should be
studied for its personality engine. Rather than using iptables and a Netfitler NFQUEUE
target to handle Nmap OS probes, Honeyd implements an entirely separate user-space
TCP/IP stack can be implemented to process the probes. In this way, every single feature
of the stack is completely controllable. The Honeyd emulator can even accept Nmap
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fingerprints to impersonate any device easily. However, there may be performance issues
with implementing a user-space TCP/IP stack. These features could be integrated into
the PLC emulator in place of the current infilter.o process and perform a performance
comparison.
Either of these methods would likely still result in values for the ISN that are not
statistically equivalent to the target PLC. Therefore, an automated method for capturing
and duplicating ISN’s should be implemented. This can be done in a number of ways,
even trivially by recording several thousand ISN’s from the target device and playing them
back. Because of the potential for transient variables this technique may still not yield a
distribution similar to the target PLC.
6.4.4

Enhanced Configurability.

Configuration can be thought of at two levels, device-level configuration and service
level-configuration. Configuration in this implementation is defined only at the service
level, meaning that each of the services offered by the emulator are configurable, but the
device is hard programmed as a Koyo DirectLogic PLC. Service level configuration occurs
via the config.txt, ccmdictionary.txt (see Chapter 3), and kseqdictionary.txt files to define
the ways the emulator responds, but the definitions only apply to the Koyo DirectLogic
PLC.
An emulator device such as this is defined by its scanning personality, and the services
it offers to users. Device- level configuration is difficult because it requires accuracy in both
the scanning definition and services definitions. Currently, both the scanning personality
(implemented in infilter.o) and services (implemented in ecom_emulator.o, webserver.py,
and modbus.py) are hardcoded.
Future work would be to implement an industrial control emulator that is configurable
at the device level. An emulator configurable at the device level would have the ability to
look like whatever make or model PLC that is desired. The current method of manually
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hard coding the personality and services makes this goal very time consuming. A process
for automating the creation of definitions for any arbitrary device would be a significant
step towards patenting and commercializing the industrial control emulator.
A potential way to accomplish this is to devise a method of recording queries and
responses from target PLCs under normal use, similar to the procedures used in this
research for CCM and K-Sequence protocols. Dictionaries would then be built for the
device that match queries to responses, and when queried the emulator would simply
respond with some variation of the dictionary response. With a sufficient number of
recordings of queries and responses, it may be possible to reproduce the most common
functionality of a device. An automated software tool could enumerate all possible entries
to a device’s website or manufacturers’ tools and record the responses. These recordings
would become potentially huge, but post recording analysis could be done to create
heuristics that define many-to-one and one-to-many query-response relations, potentially
reducing the size of the dictionary.
A variation of this technique would be to first implement base protocols, and use
recordings to adjust them according to the definitions of the specific device. Baseline
industrial protocols would be implemented in software, much like the HAP protocol is
implemented for this research effort, or the Modbus protocol for a previous research
effort [Bur12].

Once the baselines are established, a method for identifying and

implementing specific implementations of the protocol between different manufacturers
must be done.

For example, there is a Modbus specification, but all manufacturers

implement its features differently. To design a device configurable PLC, these differences
in implementations must be defined.

In this way, when the emulator is configured

to be a Siemens PLC, the emulator would use the Siemens Modbus implementation
for all of its Modbus communications. An automated method for identifying protocol
deviations or implementations, and incorporating them into the emulator definitions would

129

be the alternative to hard coded process definitions. This could be done by creating a
software device that enumerates all possible protocol variations, records their results, and
incorporates the results into the emulator definitions for that device. This is very similar to
how Nmap accomplishes its OS Fingerprint scans.
This is not trivial because of CRCs in headers, wide ranges of valid input values (like
in web based configurations), and other protocol features specifically designed to prevent
replay attacks. Furthermore, diversity of control devices and their complex operation
suggests a fully automated system may not be possible; some features will still need to
be coded manually.
6.4.5

Automated Capture of Ladder Logic for Arbitrary Programs.

The current method used to emulate the ladder logic program uploads from
the emulator to DirectSOFT5 is to record the queries and responses for an upload
from the target PLC, and place those corresponding query and response values into
kseqdictionary.txt. This method is labor intensive and restricts the operation to a static
ladder logic program that cannot be modified by a user. Since the K-Sequence protocol is
proprietary, reversing the ladder logic functionality must be done in order to add support
for any arbitrary upload or download program.
Based on this thesis, reversing this portion of the protocol may be possible. It does not
appear that there is any sort of sequence number or timing component to the K-Sequence
functionality that prevents replaying of the data, since, that is the exact method used in the
current implementation. Therefore, by methodically altering ladder logic programs through
DirectSOFT5, and observing the K-Sequence queries and responses the protocol may be
reversed.
Considering that the K-Sequence protocol is used to modify memory values, it may
simply be the case that a simple record-store-replay done by the emulator is possible. That
is, the user modifies the ladder logic program and sends it to the emulator, which stores
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the new ladder logic values in kseqdictionary.txt. When queried for ladder logic programs
in the future, the new values would simply be read from kseqdictionary.txt and sent to
DirectSOFT5.
6.4.6

Evaluation of Other SCADA Honeypots.

Apply the techniques for measuring accuracy developed in this thesis, to any other ICS
honeypots, such as the SCADA honeypot and honeywall developed by Project Basecamp
[Dig12b]. This requires acquisition of a target PLC to create a baseline. If the studied
device is discovered as fingerprintable based on the results, an automated tool can be used
to determine if the device is real or an emulation. Enhancements can also be made to make
the selected device more accurate.
6.4.7

Implementation as Evidence Collection Tool.

As discussed in Section A.3, one application of an industrial control emulator is to
perform the same type of function as a fake bomb used by the FBI. In the same capacity,
the evidence collection device has potential to be deployed by law enforcement and when
activated or accessed by the suspected terrorist, they would be arrested. The device and
device log could then be used in court to convict the individual who thought he was
accessing an actual network on perhaps a water treatment plant or power company. To
prove that it was the suspect who tried to access the device, a complex (and un-guessable)
password could be implemented and passed to the suspect. The device would log this
password being attempted as well as actions performed on the fake PLC as evidence to
convict a suspect.
Rapid deployment and re-configurability are top considerations for this device
because it must be able to look like a device on any arbitrary SCADA or ICS network.
Enhancements must be made to automate the configuration at the device level to allow for
complete device flexibility. The implemented levels of accuracy must also be reconsidered.
Since this tool is only a small aspect of the FBI’s sting operation, in these applications, it is
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more likely that a potential attacker would exclusively use the web interface to perform their
actions, therefore extensive and accurate emulation of this portion is likely more important
than a high level of packet byte accuracy. Additional important design considerations for
this type of device are robustness and scalability, overshadowing cost. Therefore, emulation
on a dedicated Laptop PC might be the best approach for accurate emulation.
6.4.8

Other Areas.

There are also several less-developed, but potentially interesting research areas
involving this implementation of the ICS field device honeypot emulator. Future research
could included performance of human experiments to test the authenticity of the device to
establish if the emulator feels authentic compared to the target PLC. In addition, testing the
implementation of the device on other singled board or embedded platforms such as the
Raspberry Pi, Beagle Board, or newer and faster Gumstix module. Compare these results
to the results of this research. And finally, generalizing the parsing tools to be useful
for comparing arbitrary .pcap files. A graphical implementation would be very useful for
determining quickly the areas that are not exactly the same. Currently, the pcap parser is
very specific to this application and a slight deviation in the order of arrival of response
packets requires preprocessing to get packets in the proper order.
6.4.9

Hardware Emulation.

Though it has not been exhaustively studied, it may be possible based on open-source
knowledge to pick a popular PLC and create a scaled-down hardware emulation. This
type of emulation is superior to application or system based emulations because the device
will be easily configurable simply based on applying the correct firmware. As a starting
point, the hardware must be identified completely and reverse engineered. If hardware and
architectures cannot be identified, fingerprinting techniques might be used to determine if
the TCP/IP stack is an open-source embedded stack (Like µIP or lwIP [Dun13]) to then
determine the hardware. After the hardware is determined, a series of reverse engineering
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intensive projects could focus on designing the emulator. This technique is similar to those
used to reverse engineer and emulate video game consoles [Sal05].
6.4.10

Implementation of a Large-Scale Network Using the Emulator.

A final aspect of future work is to demonstrate the scalability of these devices for fielddevice level research. One suggestion is to research how many emulations can currently run
on one PC without loss of accuracy. In addition, research can be conducted to determine
the best approach to scalability: a single virtual machine per emulation, like the Project
Basecamp SCADA honeypot, or many emulations in a single virtual machine. There is
also the Megatux approach [Mar09]: The Megatux project claims to implement 1 Million
computers from only 4480 Intel processors. This suggests that 223 copies of computers
are running on one Intel processor. Investigation would include the possibility of using this
technique to implement ICS field device emulators. Finally, an investigation into which
portions of an industrial control honeynet should be emulated, and which should be real
hardware is warranted. In studies done on Honeyd, emulated network components were
shown to have predictable link delays that made fingerprinting honeypots implemented
with Honeyd trivial [FYC06].
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Appendix A: Additional Applications for Industrial Control Emulators

A.1

Sensor in Industrial Networks
ICS cyber sensors can be compared to production-class honeypots, which directly

enhance the security of operational networks. Production-class honeypot systems primarily
function as security tools in conjunction with firewalls and Intrusion Detection and
Prevention Systems (IDS/IPS) managed by the same IT staff that operates the corporate
network. When activity is logged on a production honeypot system, the information is
used to quickly identify and respond to an active threat or newly identified vulnerability.
The IT staff responds relatively quickly in response to honeypot activity, the same way they
might respond to a barrage of malicious packets detected by the IDS.
Unlike SCADA honeypots for attack-landscape research, cyber sensor honeypots do
not warrant as much effort in maintenance and design. Because the honeypot emulator
devices themselves have no production value, any activity on them is considered suspicious
and is investigated.
Honeypots can also prevent attacks both directly and indirectly. Depending on the
intention of the honeypot, software might be used to detect and slow down or even stop
attacks being carried out by worms [Oud10]. Worms are automated viruses that seek to
spread and infect as many hosts as quickly and efficiently as possible. Honeyd is one such
honeypot implementation that takes active measures to slow down and stop worms from
spreading, giving IT administrators more time to react to the attack. Honeyd is an example
of what is known as a low-interaction honeypot which emulates limited functionality and
responds to a limited set of attacker commands. In this way the worm loses time on the
honeypot by attacking non-production computers [Oud10].
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A.2

Laboratory Research
Industrial control emulators in a laboratory environment have many of the same

advantages over simulations as using real hardware.

Accurate emulators not only

implement the responses to user queries in the same manner as their real-hardware
counterparts, but also emulate the timing profile. When timing and protocol responses
have been accurately emulated, the devices can be used in the same way as real hardware
for research experiments with less cost, setup and maintenance effort.
Accurate emulators also have several advantages over real hardware devices. In
addition to reduced cost, emulators can be much more robust because error conditions
such as buffer overflows and bad firmware uploads can be recovered from easily. While
the real device might be permanently damaged by such vulnerabilities, an emulated device
is virtually impervious because the services have control over which vulnerabilities are
ignored or duplicated, depending on the purpose of the emulator and severity of the
vulnerability.
Uses for emulated research networks include the study of automated malware
propagation, network reactions to wide scale scanning, denial of service (DoS) techniques,
pivot attacks from human machine interfaces to devices or devices to devices, and more.
A.3

Evidence Collection Tool
Apart from cyber sensing, an industrial control field device or PLC emulator can be

used as an evidence collection device. This application is comparable to the way the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) uses fake bombs to catch terrorists in the act of executing acts
of terrorism [Dur13, MPH12]. Since this application has never been implemented before,
and is out of scope of this research, it is further developed as future work in Section 6.4.7.
A.3.0.1

Education.

In the classroom, an industrial control emulator can teach the basics of SCADA and
Industrial ICS with the goal of base-level knowledge. Currently, the only way to gain hands
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on experience with industrial control networks is to implement an actual system which, as
previously mentioned, can be prohibitively expensive. The same is true for features that are
particular to physical devices like uploading and downloading of ladder logic programs.
Though programming simulators are available through several manufacturers to learn and
test ladder logic programs, there is no known way to test network communications and
functionality without having an actual industrial control device to perform those operations
[Sie12, Roc12].
An industrial control emulator used for education would not necessarily need to be
a perfectly accurate emulation. Since the device is an acknowledged emulator, timing,
protocol deviations or simplifications, and incomplete implementations may be acceptable.
However, if the goal is to simulate an ICS network that communicates with arbitrary real
devices on universal protocols, timing and protocol deviations might not be tolerated.
Furthermore, the implementation of device failure conditions, or known vulnerabilities may
not be an important feature in educational emulators.
Educational emulators can be used to develop skills and understanding of tools and
techniques used to conduct attacks on industrial control networks. These emulators can
be used to extend the capabilities of tools like the Nmap [Lyo12] network scanner and
the Metasploit [Met12] remote exploitation tool from traditional IT networks to industrial
control networks.
In this way, an attack on an educational emulator demonstrates the parallels with
traditional IT attacks using the same toolset, but also illustrates the physical effects of
an attack on an ICS network. An emulator that responds to scans and attacks from
tools like Nmap and Metasploit in the same way as the target device, provides hands-on
ICS attack experience without putting an actual device at risk. The emulators could be
remotely configured by instructors to implement any number of device configurations and
vulnerabilities while recording the techniques and strategies the students use to exploit.
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To respond in the same way as the target device, industrial control emulators require
a high level of accuracy to fool fingerprinting and port scanning tools, as well ensure the
tools that work on the target device also work successfully on the emulator. However, even
a lower-accuracy emulator has value in a training environment. For example, the student
could be tasked with identifying a networked ICS device as a honeypot among several
real devices, employing techniques such as network scanning and protocol dissection to
investigate unfamiliar industrial protocols.
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Appendix B: Features of Related Research

Implementation Details

Implementation Version
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Year

2013

2012

2008

2004

Author/Group

R. Jaromin (AFIT)

D. Berman(AFIT)

D. Peterson (Digital
Bond)

V. Pothamsetty, M. Franz
(CIAG)

Platform

Gumstix

Gumstix

2 Virtual Machines or
Real PLC

PC

Publically Known Vulnerability

Yes

No

No

No

Accuracy Data

Yes

Incomplete

None

None

Representative PLF Fingerprint

Actual Koyo PLC

Generic Device

Actual Modicom PLC

Generic PLC

Special Requirements

iptables, queuing

iptables

3 NICs, 2 VMs, Real
PLC

Honeyd, iptables

Target Device

Koyo Directlogics
PLC Generic

Modbus TCP device

Modicom Quantum
PLC

Generic PLC

Platform/Portability

Gumstix

Gumstix

Requires 2 VMs or 1
VM and a Real PLC

Honeyd Based

Logging

Out-Of-Band

Out-Of-Band

Out-of-Band

Local

Configurable

Device-level only

Device-level only

Device-level only

Device-level only

Fails Like Target Device

Some

No

No

No

Protocols Supported

HAP, Modbus, HTTP

Modbus

FTP, Telnet, HTTP,
SNMP, Modbus

FTP, Telnet, HTTP, Modbus

Communications Meduim

Ethernet

Ethernet

Ethernet

Ethernet

Applied Research

Planned future work

None

[Wad11] S. Wade

[FAA+09] G. Franceschinis,
et al.
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Appendix C: Iptables Rules in iptables_rules.sh

Rule 1:

Rule 2:

Rule 3:

Rule 4:

Rule 5:

Rule 6:

Rule 7:

Result

"For all incoming packets on eth0 that have not been marked with
0x02 send them to queue number 3"

Rule

iptables -t mangle -A INPUT -m mark ! --mark 0x2/2 -j NFQUEUE
--queue-num 3 -i eth0

Resource

Queue number 3 user-space program is logging.o

Result

"for all incoming TCP packets on eth0, with TCP destination port
22 (SSH), accept"

Rule

iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 22 -m tcp -j ACCEPT -i
$INTERFACE_LOGGING

Resource

n/a

Result

"For all incoming TCP packets on eth0 with destination port 80, send
them to queue number 1"

Rule

iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 80 -m tcp -j NFQUEUE --queuenum 1 -i eth0

Resource

Queue number 1 user-space program is infilter.o

Result

"For all incoming TCP packets on eth0 with destination port 1, send
them to queue number 1"

Rule

iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 1 -m tcp -j NFQUEUE --queuenum 1 -i eth0

Resource

Queue number 1 user-space program is infilter.o

Result

"For all incoming TCP packets on eth1 with source port 502
(Modbus), accept"

Rule

iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --sport 502 -m tcp -j ACCEPT

Resource

n/a

Result

"For all incoming TCP packets on eth0 with destination port 502
(Modbus), accept"

Rule

iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 502 -m tcp -j ACCEPT

Resource

n/a

Result

"For all incoming TCP packets on eth0 that do not match a previous
rule, reject with TCP reset"

Rule

iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -j REJECT --reject-with tcp-reset -i eth0

Resource

n/a
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Rule 8:

Rule 9:

Rule 10:

Rule 11:

Rule 12:

Rule 13:

Rule 14:

Result

"For all incoming UDP packets on eth0 with destination port 28784
(HAP), accept"

Rule

iptables -A INPUT -p udp --dport 28784 -m udp -j ACCEPT -i eth0

Resource

n/a

Result

"For all incoming ICMP packets on eth0, send them to queue
number 1"

Rule

iptables -A INPUT -p icmp -m icmp -j NFQUEUE --queue-num 1 -i
eth0

Resource

Queue number 1 user-space program is infilter.o

Result

"For all incoming UDP packets on eth0 with destination port 1, send
them to queue number 1"

Rule

iptables -A INPUT -p udp --dport 1 -m udp -j NFQUEUE --queuenum 1 -i eth0

Resource

Queue number 1 user-space program is infilter.o

Result

"For all incoming UDP packets that do not match a previous rule,
reject with ICMP port unreachable"

Rule

iptables -A INPUT -p udp -j REJECT --reject-with icmp-portunreachable -i eth0

Resource

n/a

Result

"For all outgoing TCP packets on eth0 with destination port 80, that
have not been marked with 0x1, send them to queue number 2"

Rule

iptables -t mangle-A OUTPUT-p udp--sport 28784-m mark !--mark
0x1/1-m udp -j NFQUEUE --queue-num 2 -o eth0

Resource

Queue number 2 user-space program is outfilter.o

Result

"For all outgoing TCP packets on eth0 with destination port 80, that
have been marked with 0x1, accept"

Rule

iptables -t mangle -A OUTPUT -p tcp --sport 80 -m mark --mark
0x1/1 -m tcp -j ACCEPT -o eth0

Resource

n/a

Result

"For all outgoing UDP packets on eth0 with destination port 28784
(HAP), that have not been marked with 0x1, send them to queue
number 2"

Rule

iptables -t mangle -A OUTPUT -p udp --sport 28784 -m mark ! -mark 0x1/1 -m udp -j NFQUEUE --queue-num 2 -o eth0

Resource

Queue number 2 user-space program is outfilter.o
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Rule 15:

Rule 16:

Rule 17:

Result

"For all outgoing UDP packets on eth0 with destination port 28784
(HAP), that have been marked with 0x1, accept"

Rule

iptables -t mangle -A OUTPUT -p udp --sport 28784 -m mark -mark 0x1/1 -m udp -j ACCEPT -o eth0

Resource

n/a

Result

"For all outgoing packets on eth0, set the TTL to 255"

Rule

iptables -t mangle -A POSTROUTING -j TTL --ttl-set 255 -o eth0

Resource

n/a

Result

"For all outgoing TCP packets on eth0, send them to queue number
3"

Rule

iptables -t mangle -A POSTROUTING -m mark ! --mark 0x2/2 -j
NFQUEUE --queue-num 3 -o eth0

Resource

Queue number 3 user-space program is logging.o
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Appendix D: Web and HAP Protocol Functions Implemented in the ICS field device
emulator

Function

Accessible through

Download ladder logic

DirectSOFT5

Disable Protection via Password

DirectSOFT5

Read ladder logic dynamic status

DirectSOFT5

Read CPU information

NetEdit3, DirectSOFT5

Read Firmware Revision info

NetEdit3, Web browser, DirectSOFT5

Read Booter Revision info

NetEdit3, Web browser, DirectSOFT5

Read PWB Revision info

NetEdit3, Web browser, DirectSOFT5

Read PLD Revision info

NetEdit3, Web browser, DirectSOFT5

Read CPU Revision info

NetEdit3, Web browser, DirectSOFT5

Read / Configure Module ID

NetEdit3, Web browser, DirectSOFT5

Read / Configure Module Name

NetEdit3, Web browser, DirectSOFT5

Read / Configure Module Description

NetEdit3, Web browser, DirectSOFT5

Read / Configure Module IP Address (Manually)

NetEdit3, Web browser, DirectSOFT5

Read / Configure Module Subnet Mask (Manually)

NetEdit3, Web browser, DirectSOFT5

Read / Configure Module Subnet Gateway (Manually)

NetEdit3, Web browser, DirectSOFT5

Read / Configure Module IP Address (DHCP)

NetEdit3, Web browser, DirectSOFT5

Read / Configure Module Subnet Mask (DHCP)

NetEdit3, Web browser, DirectSOFT5

Read / Configure Module Subnet Gateway (DHCP)

NetEdit3, Web browser, DirectSOFT5

Read / Read Only Web Config

NetEdit3, Web browser

Read / Enable Web Server

NetEdit3

Test CPU Access

NetEdit3, DirectSOFT5

Password protection

DirectSOFT5

Bruteforce password cracking

Metasploit

Nmap OS Fingerprint Scan

Nmap

Device Polling

NetEdit3, DirectSOFT5

Addressed Queries

NetEdit3, DirectSOFT5
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Read Device info

NetEdit3, DirectSOFT5

Read CCM Data (select operations)

DirectSOFT5

Write CCM Data (select operations)

DirectSOFT5

Read K-Sequence Data (select operations)

DirectSOFT5

Read Version Info

NetEdit3, DirectSOFT5

Read Ethernet Statistics

NetEdit3, Web browser
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Appendix E: Non-deterministic Fields

E.1

Non-deterministic Fields
These are fields whose values change from query to query depending on the state of

the querying computer, not necessarily the device (PLC or Emulator), or that cannot be
predicted (such as the Initial Sequence Number).
E.1.1

Non-Deterministic Bytes in Web Response.
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E.2

Non-deterministic Bytes in HAP Response

Table E.5: Ethernet Header Fields
Offset(Hex)

Description

0x0B

Ethernet Address (MAC) 6th byte

Table E.6: IP Header Fields
Offset(Hex)

Description

0x18

IP CRC 1st byte

0x19

IP CRC 2nd byte

0x1D

IP Source byte 4

Table E.7: UDP Header Fields
Offset(Hex)

Description

0x28

UDP CRC 1st byte

0x29

UDP CRC 2nd byte
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E.3

Non-deterministic Fields in Nmap OS Fingerprint

Table E.8: UDP Header Fields
Section

Field

Description

OS Guess

MAC Address

6th Byte

Scan Details

SP†

Sequence Prediction Index

Scan Details

ISR†

TCP ISN Counter Rate

Scan Details

UN‡

Unused ICMP port unreachable field nonzero

TCP Sequence
TCP Sequence Prediction†
Prediction

Equal to base 10 version of SP

†These fields are based on the TCP initial sequence numbers in response packets. Although they are
non-deterministic, they are still considered relevant fields with regard to accuracy, and their matching
is considered important.
‡This field is non-deterministic, but is still considered relevant with regard to accuracy, and its
matching is considered important.
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Appendix F: Partial Factorial Design

Scenario Platform

Request
Type

Request
Frequency

Service

Workload
Gen

1

PC

Std Web

slow

Web

web-tool

2

PC

Std Web

PLC Break

Web

web-tool

2a

PC

Std Web

PC Break

Web

web-tool

3

PC

Non-std Web

slow

Web

nmap

4

PC

Non-std Web

PLC Break

Web

nmap

5

PC

Std HAP

slow

HAP

hap-tool

6

PC

Std HAP

PLC Break

HAP

hap-tool

6a

PC

Std HAP

PC Break

HAP

hap-tool

7

PC

Non-std HAP

slow

HAP

Metasploit

8

PC

Non-std HAP

PLC Break

HAP

Metasploit

8a

PC

Non-std HAP

PC Break

HAP

Metasploit

9

Gum

Std Web

slow

Web

web-tool

10

Gum

Std Web

PLC Break

Web

web-tool

10a

Gum

Std Web

Gum Break

Web

web-tool

11

Gum

Non-std Web

slow

Web

nmap

12

Gum

Non-std Web

PLC Break

Web

nmap

13

Gum

Std HAP

slow

HAP

hap-tool

14

Gum

Std HAP

PLC Break

HAP

hap-tool

14a

Gum

Std HAP

Gum Break

HAP

hap-tool

15

Gum

Non-std HAP

slow

HAP

Metasploit

16

Gum

Non-std HAP

PLC Break

HAP

Metasploit

16a

Gum

Non-std HAP

Gum Break

HAP

Metasploit

17

PLC

Std Web

slow

Web

web-tool

18

PLC

Std Web

PLC Break

Web

web-tool

19

PLC

Non-std Web

slow

Web

nmap

20

PLC

Non-std Web

PLC Break

Web

nmap

21

PLC

Std HAP

slow

HAP

hap-tool
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22

PLC

Std HAP

PLC Break

HAP

hap-tool

23

PLC

Non-std HAP

slow

HAP

Metasploit

24

PLC

Non-std HAP

PLC Break

HAP

Metasploit
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Appendix G: Custom Tool Description and Validation

G.1

Accuracy Parser: pcap_accuracy_parse.py
G.1.1

Description.

The accuracy parser compares two similar .pcap files to determine their byte
differences. The first .pcap file is the baseline file from the target PLC that captured the
packet conversation between the workload generator and the PLC, the second .pcap file
captures the conversation between the workload generator and the emulator for the same
experimental conditions.
This Python script works by separating the first .pcap file into streams, and measuring
byte differences between each stream (in the case of this experiment, 1000 streams).
Since these responses are all from the target PLC, the only differences should be nondeterministic bytes indicated in Appendix C, a report of the deterministic (or non-changing)
bytes is generated. The .pcap from the emulator is processed the same way. Finally the two
reports for the target PLC and the emulator bytes are compared to each other to generate a
summary for all queries, which shows the differences at the byte level for every packet all
1000 responses.
G.1.2

Validation.

The program is run two ways to validate its functionality. The first ran the same file
for both input parameters. The results are that all bytes matched. Next, a two captures
for the same query are taken, and the bytes are compared manually to ensure the results
produced by the tool are accurate. The manual verification concluded that the bytes that
are dissimilar are in fact different between the two captures, and the deterministic bytes are
actually the same.
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G.2

Workload Generators: htmlget_mt and hap_mt
G.2.1

Description.

These files generate the standard web and HAP workloads at nominal timing rates for
a variable number of queries. Both generators are designed using raw Linux sockets, and
therefore, many aspects are definable, as a result, however, certain intricacies such as the
TCP handshake must be implemented manually. The number of successful connections,
response time, and moving average of response times are displayed real-time as the
programs execute.
G.2.2

Validation.

Both tools are validated using the packet capture accuracy parsing tool, pcap_accuracy_
parse.py, already validated. The procedure for each tool is the same and is shown in Figure
G.1.
A packet capture is taken for one web or HAP request using the predefined tool
(Internet Explorer 9.0.8112 for web, and NetEdit3 for HAP) to make one query to the target
PLC. A second capture is taken under exactly the same conditions at least one minute later
for a total of two captures from the baseline tool. The accuracy parser is run on both of
these packet captures to identify packet bytes that are non-deterministic for a single query.
A packet capture is then taken for a single query using the custom workload generator,
and this packet capture is compared to the first capture using the base program using the
accuracy parser. The non-deterministic bytes are then compared to those measured from
step 2. If all the bytes are the same, then the workload generator is validated.
Using this procedure 35 bytes are found to be non-deterministic for the web browser
query, all deterministic bytes matched when the web browser capture is compared to the
htmlget_mt capture. For the NetEdit3 query (after accounting for MAC and IP), 8 bytes
are non-deterministic and all deterministic bytes matched when the NetEdit3 capture is
compared to the hap_mt capture.
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Figure G.1: Validation of workload generators.

G.3

Timing parsers: web_time_parse.py and udp_time_parse.py
G.3.1

Description.

The two time parser files take .pcap files as inputs, and separate the files into individual
streams based on the to and from ports in the .pcap capture. This method is valid because
the custom workload generators are explicitly give a unique source port to use for each
query, and reusing the source ports is not allowed.
The difference between first packet per stream and the last packet is generated and
averaged together for all successful streams for a mean response time. This procedure
works with the standard web and HAP response captures and the HAP non-standard
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(Metasploit) workload. It does not work for the web non-standard (Nmap) workload
because the packets are sent using random source ports and sent to destination ports in
non-sequential order.
G.3.2

Validation.

To provide a preliminary validation, the response time values generated by the time
parsers are compared to the response time values generated by the workload generators.
The primary validation is completed by hand and compared the calculated values from the
timing parsers to those seen for the timestamp value for the packets in a graphical packet
capture program. A subset for both the web and HAP standard workload responses are
successfully validated.
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Appendix H: Additional Results for HAP standard Workload
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Appendix I: Configuring the Gumstix Emulator

I.1

Loading Provided Images
The emulator can be placed onto a secure digital (SD) card via an image created of

the final working copy on of the Gumstix emulator following these steps. Most of the hard
work is done by shell scripts. This guide assumes a USB SD card reader is attached to the
Linux development computer.
1. Insert the target SD card into USB SD card reader.
2. Partition the target SD card with "boot" and "rootfs" partitions. (The mksdcard.sh
script is in the Images directory of the Resources Disc included that accompanies
this document).
#build partitions for the new SD card:
$sudo mksdcard.sh /dev/sdb overo minimal
#mount new partitions
$sudo mount -t vfat /dev/sdb1 /media/boot
$sudo mount -t ext3 /dev/sdb1 /media/rootfs
3. From a command shell, execute sudo nautilus to get super-user privileges for the file
navigator. Use this program to delete all current files in the boot and rootfs partitions
of the target SD. Or, from the command shell:
#delete everything in the /media/rootfs/
$cd /media/rootfs
$sudo rm -r ./*.*
$cd /media/boot
$sudo rm -r ./*.*
4. From a command shell, navigate to the Images directory of the Resources Disc
included that accompanies this document.
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5. Execute sudo ./load_image.sh emulator. It will take several minutes for the files to
be copied onto the target SD card.
6. To do this manually, the commands are:
#Copy boot files onto first partition:
$sudo cp MLO /media/boot/MLO
$sudo cp u-boot.bin /media/boot/u-boot.bin
$sudo cp uImage /media/boot/uImage
#Expand the root file system archive on to the second partition:
$sudo tar xaf roofs.tar.bz2 --strip-components 2 -C /media/rootfs
(Two other images are included:(1) Angstrom Linux image with both Ethernet ports
configured on Tobi-Duo (2) Angstrom Linux image with iptables already installed)
I.2

Building From Scratch
Berman’s previous effort developed a detailed set of instructions for building an

operational Gumstix device from scratch with most of the required components needed
for this follow-on effort [Ber12 (Appendix-A)].
I.3

Saving New Images
A script is developed to easily save Gumstix images for quick Gumstix development.

It is also located in the Images directory of the Resources Disc included that accompanies
this document.
1. Insert the target SD card into USB SD card reader.
2. From a command shell, navigate to the Images directory of the Resources Disc
included that accompanies this document.
3. Execute sudo ./make_image.sh <image_name>. It will take several minutes for the
files to be copied and compressed from the target SD card.
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4. To do this manually, the commands are:
#Copy boot files from first partition:
$sudo cp /media/boot/MLO ./MLO
$sudo cp /media/boot/u-boot.bin ./u-boot.bin
$sudo cp /media/boot/uImage ./uImage
#Compress the root file system archive from the second partition:
$sudo tar caf ./<image_name>.image.tar.bz2 /media/rootfs
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